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For the past decade, no accident law initiatives have held the 
stage so conspicuously as (1) the efforts to federalize substantial 
areas of tort and products liability jurisprudence, and (2) the 
crafting and publication of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability.' The objective of this Article is to evaluate 
selected provisions of these two endeavors through the heuristic of 
the two leading rationales for modern accident law. The first and 
older rationale is that of corrective justice; the more contemporary 
approach is that of economic efficiency. This Article will examine 
whether these two facially incongruous constructs are actually more 
alike, in theory and in application, than their respective proponents 
ordinarily acknowledge. 
After analyzing two illustrative sections of the most recently 
proposed federal reform legislation, The Product Liability Reform 
Act: and one provision of the Products Liability Restatement, the 
Article concludes that (1) neither the corrective justice nor the 
economic efficiency analysis is more revealing than its theoretical 
counterpart; and (2) the merits and shortcomings of this sampling 
of Products Liability Restatement and Reform Act provisions are 
equally apparent under either analysis. Put another way, a tort 
rule that fails to  do justice will likely lack the deterrent effect that 
is central to the argument of the economic efficiency school, and a 
rule that is arguably just in the result reached between the parties, 
but which disregards the burdens of administration or the likeli- 
hood that it will reduce risk-generating behavior, wil l  be rejected 
as irrational, wasteful, or both. 
The Reform Act and the Products Liability Restatement may be 
interestingly juxtaposed on numerous levels. The objective of the 
Products Liability Restatement, in keeping with American Law 
Institute (A.L.I. or In~ti tute)~ tradition, is not to  reform the la\*?, 
but rather to  rationalize it. It does so by reconciling to  the extent 
RESTATEAIENT ClXrm~) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Proposed Find Dnh ,  Apr. 1, 
1997) bereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEAIENT]. 
S. 648,105th Cong. (1997). 
The American Law Institute is a private body ofjudges, practicing attorneys, nnd legal 
scholars that drafts and publishes the Restatements of various fields of tho law. 
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possible conflicting state standards and creating a unified presenta- 
tion of products liability law that might, the hypothesis goes, 
prompt a state high court in a jurisdiction that had not ruled on 
the matter to adopt the Restatement position as the optimal rule of 
law? 
The federal tort reform proposals, introduced in each session of 
Congress for the past dozen  ears: differ in approach, as their 
pronounced objective is to "reform" a field within the civil justice 
system that proponents of the legislation believe no longer func- 
tions fairly or effe~tively.~ The logic, if not the particulars, of some 
proposals, such as those that would affect joint and several liability 
or liability of nonmanufacturing sellers, has been endorsed in tort 
reform legislation that has gained checkered adoption at the state 
level.7 The presence or absence of harmonious state reform 
endeavors, however, is not a predicate for congressional action.' 
The Restatement and the federal tort  reform activities differ not 
only in objective, but also in focus; i.e., in the selection of subjects 
addressed. While the Products Liability Restatement targets 
substantive standards of liability, such as plaintfls prima facie 
case for manufacturing, design, or informational (warnings or 
instructions) defect claims: the most recent federal tort reform 
proposals have for the most part avoided substantive liability 
issues. Instead, the federal provisions have addressed matters of 
defenses (e.g., alcohol-related plaintiff miscond~ct);'~ several 
' cf. hlERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THIS THE AMERICAN LA\!' INSTITUTE 1-4 (1996) 
(describing Institute's purpose, operations, and membership). 
A recitation of the as-yet Sisyphean efforts of federal tort reform proponents, dating to 
1985, is set forth in the Appendix, infia p. 1097. 
The Reform Act is accompanied by a report of the Committee on Commerco, Scienco, 
and Transportation, S. REP. NO. 105-32 (1997). This report justifies federal legislation in 
this field: "Prlhe current morass of product liability laws is a problem of national concern 
that requires Congressional action. The current system of compensating peoplo injured by 
defective products is costly, slow, inequitable, and unpredictable." Id. at  2. 
" See generally STATE CAPITAL LAW FIRM GROUP, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: 50 STATE 
HANDBOOK (Jerome H. Kahnke & James A. Price eds., 1995) (providing description of law 
governing liability of nonmanufacturing sellers on state-by-state basis). 
Modem legislation will pass substantive due process muster upon a showing that tho 
legislature, in this case the United States Congress, has identified a legitimate stato 
objective and that the legislation bears a "real and substantial relation to the objectivo 
sought to be attained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,625 (1934). 
PRODUCE LIABILITY IUSTATEhlENT, supra note 1, $2. 
lo S. 648, 105th Cong. $ 104(a) (1997). 
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liability for noneconomic harm;" proper parties (e.g., nonmanu- 
facturing sellers);* and damages (e.g., limitations upon and 
burden of proof for punitive damages).13 
These very differences make the Products Liability Restatement 
and recent federal tort reform proposals an informative matrix 
within which to  assess modern tort policy, whether from the private 
law perspective of the American Law Institute14 or the plenary 
reform authority of Congress.ls This examination will rely upon 
Senate Bill 648, as an exemplar of recent federal reform efforts, 
and the Products Liability Restatement. It is intended as a 
preliminary evaluation of how three illustrative provi- 
sions-pertaining to warning duties, nonmanufacturing seller 
liability, and joint and several liability for noneconomic harm-fare 
when measured against the goals of corrective justice-morality and 
efficiency-deterrence. 
First, regarding the Products Liability Restatement treatment of 
warnings defects, the new Restatement puts doctrinal categories 
(strict liability, negligence, warranty) aside in favor of an omnibus 
definition of a warning or instruction defect.16 Second, the Reform 
Act limits the doctrine of joint and several liability in section 110, 
the provision addressing apportionment of noneconomic loss. 
Section 110 states: "In a product liability action, the liability of 
each defendant for noneconomic loss shall be several only and shall 
l1 I d  8 110. 
* I d  8 103. 
'3 I d  $108. 
l4 In In connection, Guido Calabresi and Jeffrey 0. Cooper tell the m e l o u s  story in 
which Justice Cardozo is said to have leveraged the Restatement ('First) of Torts position thnt 
"negligence in the air" will not suffice by his prediction to the Institute thnt the yet 
undecided Palsgmf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 19281, would soon take such 
a position. Guido Calabresi & JeBey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L 
REV. 859,867 (1996). Cardozo is said to have then employed the mtidpnted Restatement 
position to bolster his arguments in the majority opinion in P&&mfi Id. 
1.5 This Article will not discuss separately the Commerce Clause vulnernbility, if my, of 
federal tort reform. SeegenemUy United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding Gun- 
Free School Zone Act of 1990 beyond Congress's Commerce Clnuse po~~er). 
l6 Section 2(c) states that, for purposes of determining liability under section 1, o. product 
"is defective because of inadequate instructions or warning vrhen the foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of n?nsonnble 
instructions or warnings by the seller. . . ." PRODUCTS LIABILITY RSTATl3IEhT, supm note 
1, § 2(c). 
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not be joint."17 Third, under Reform Act section 103, nonmanu- 
facturing sellers generally will be answerable in damages only upon 
a showing of negligence, intentional wrongdoing, or breach of an 
express warranty.18 The Reform Act provides that the plaintiff 
can, nonetheless, proceed against the nonmanufacturing seller as 
though it were a man~facturer'~ (i.e., in strict liability) should the 
manufacturer not be amenable to in personam jurisdiction or upon 
the court's determination that the manufacturer would be unable 
to satisfy a judgment?' The Act also alleviates statute of limita- 
tions problems that might arise due to delays in determining that 
a manufacturer would be unable to satisfy a judgment?' 
Before analyzing these three provisions under modern tor t  law's 
"root stock" principles of corrective justice and economic efficiency, 
I undertake in Part I1 to survey, briefly, these two constructs. This 
analysis necessitates examination of the argued distinctions 
between these divergent schools of torts thinkers: (1) those who 
claim that tort law's objectives of reducing accident costs22 and 
l7 S. 648 $110. The accompanying Senate Report explains: "[The Act] eliminates joint 
liability for 'noneconomic damages' (e.g., damages for pain and suffering or omotional 
distress). This means that each defendant will be liable for damages for pain and suffering 
in an amount proportional to its share of fault." S. REP. NO. 105-32, a t  56 (1997). Tho 
Reform Act also describes the trier of fact's role in determining "percentage of responsibility" 
and a resultant levy of damages against a losing defendant. S. 648 $110(b)(2). It provides 
that such damages shall be "allocated to the defendant in direct proportion to tho percentago 
of responsibility of the defendant," with the trier of fact assigning "tho porcontago of 
responsibility of each person responsible for the claimant's harm, whether or not such porson 
is a party to the action." Id. $ 110(b)(l)-(2). 
S. 648 $ 103(a)(l). "In general.-In any product liability action, a product seller othor 
than a manufacturer shall be liable to a claimant only if the claimant establishes [tho 
existence of one of three narrow sets of fads]." Id. (emphasis supplied). 
l9 Id. $ 103. 
20 Id. $ 103(b)(l)(A)-(B). 
"Prlhe statute of limitations applicable to claims asserting liability of (I product soller 
as a manufacturer shall be tolled from the date of filing of a complaint against tho 
manufacturer to the date that judgment is entered against the manufacturer." Id. 
0 103(b)(2). 
See, e.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 151 (N.J. 1979) 
("Strict liability in a sense is but an attempt to minimize the costs of accidents and to 
consider who should bear those costs."). Suter cites Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, 
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972) hereinafter Calabrosi 
& Hirschoff, Strict Liability], and concludes: Wsing this approach, it is obvious that tho 
manufacturer rather than the factory employee is 'in the better position both to judgo 
whether the avoidance costs would exceed foreseeable accident costs and to act on that 
judgment.' " Suter, 406 k 2 d  at  152; see also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight 
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encouraging beneficial behavior are effectively validated through 
the economic model of efficien~y;~~ and (2) those who urge that 
these objectives are best achieved through principles grounded in 
corrective justice and morality.24 Part I1 also sketches the sporad- 
ic explicit judicial recognition of these doctrines. 
Part 111 analyzes the selected Restatement and Reform Act 
provisions in terms of the claimed but inexact distinctions betmeen 
the positions taken by the corrective justice and efficiency camps. 
Part IV assesses the conclusions supported by the comparisons 
made, and Part V renders preliminary conclusions regarding the 
overall operative homeostasis of simultaneous de fmto application 
of corrective justice and efficiency principles to accident lam. More 
precisely, Part V applies the Legal Pragmatist approach advanced 
by Holmes, James, and Posne? and concludes that efficiency and 
corrective justice principles alike hold measurable predictive value 
in gauging how tort cases have been and wi l l  continue to be 
decided.26 Relieved of the notion that efficiency principles should 
Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212,1231 (6th Cir. 1980) (hfemtt, J., dissenting) (u[A]ccident costs 
[can be] minimized by placing ultimate liability on the least cost nvoider.' ' (citing GUIDO 
CALABRESI, TEE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: ALEGAL AND ECONO~UC ANALYSIS (1970) [hereinnfter 
CALABRESI, COSTS OF  ACCIDENT^)). 
Various empirical evidence supports the conclusion thnt tort reform elevntcs o v d  
societal productivity and wealth. See, e.g., THOhIAS J. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE CAUSES AND 
OF Wrr,l'rY REM)m SOBE EBIPIRICAL EVIDENCE 27 (Nntionnl Bureau of Econ. 
Research Wor?iing Paper No. 4989, 1995) (analyzing effect of tort reform upon industry 
liability; concluding "that liabiity-reducing reforms are associnted with higher lev& of 
output per worker and employment, in a broad range of industries"). 
=See, eg., Rocanik by Procanikv. Cillo, 478 k 2 d  755,763 (N.J. 1984) (commenting, in 
context of de novo consideration of wrongful birth claim by impaired child for emotional 
distress and impaired childhood: "Also a t  work is an appraisal of the role of tort lavr in 
compensating injured parties, involving as the role does, not only reason, but olso fnirness, 
predictabiity, and even deterrence of future wrongful acts."). 
''See infia notes 296-298 and accompanying text (explainingview thnt nny legal theory's 
strength rests on its value for predicting future action). 
26 The surmise that the law and economics and the corrective justice npproaches to 
accident law may, in fact, complement each other is neither original to the author nor to 
other theoretical motifs. See h W  F.GRADY, CASES AND hZATERIALS ON TORTS xv (1994) 
(%gal Realists oftensay that two opposing policies yield [a] legal rule thnt is just righLm 
(referencing Thomas C. Grey, LungdeU's Orthodbxy. 45 U. Fi'i'~. L. REV. 1 (1983))). Perhnps 
if, as it has sometimes been described in comparison to strict linbiity, negligence (as 
classically interpreted as a standard bearer of corrective justice prinaples) is hot, nnd 
economic models (at least to critics) are cold, then their mutual advnncement of nccident Inw 
is "just right." 
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explain all or most of civil liability, or that corrective justice 
principles should do so, a Legal Pragmatist approach permits the 
adoption of both corrective justice and efficiency models as means 
or instruments of understanding modern tort principles and 
anticipating their effect. 
Some have argued that both the Products Liability Restatement 
and the Reform Act are deficient in degree for lacking explicit 
objectives compatible with a public policy unaffected by business or 
plaintiffs' trial bar pressures. Be this criticism deserved or not, 
legal theorists have underserved the debate?' The legal academic 
community has mainly stayed on the sideline, declining to apply in 
a comprehensive way corrective justice, economic, or alternative 
theories in a broad-spectrumed manner to the leading tort initia- 
tives of the day. In my view, legal change without an underlying 
defensible public ethic risks reflecting politics over jurisprudential 
processes, while philosophical exploration of tort law untied to any 
objective of examining or criticizing today's most important accident 
law issues is simple schola~ticism.~~ 
I elected this subject because of my overall dissatisfaction with the level of analysis 
revealed in the floor debate regarding the Products Liability Restatement and with 
congressional examination of federal reform proposals advanced over the past several years. 
Much of the dispute surrounding the Institute's consideration of the new Restatement 
concerned whether particular provisions favored or disfavored the competing interests of 
plaintiffs or defendants. See John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law 
Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Design Defects-A Survey of the Statcs 
Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. M ~ h f .  L. REV. 493,507 (1996) (examining Products Liability 
Restatement and concluding that it represents "[mlovement from [plro-[clonsumer to Iplro- 
[mlanufacturer"). Similarly, the legislative history of the current Reform Act and its 
predecessors has only rarely escaped the gravitational pull of politics and vested interost 
polemic. 
I should add that the A.L.I. Reporters and its leadership sustained the process and 
Institute tradition above interest group arguments that threatened to turn the proceedings 
into a legislative session. 
In this regard I am pleased to see that I am not alone. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mkcd 
Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1801, 1810 (1997) (finding proportion of contemporary philosophy of law scholarship to bo 
"highly abstruse and abstract"). 
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A. GENERALLY 
As tort observers have noted recently, two distinct schools of tort 
philosophy currently compete for the torts flag.29 The older of the 
two approaches is commonly termed corrective justice, and its 
influential group of scholars hew to the position that the original 
and still primary goal of tor t  law, including the law of products 
liability, is righting wrongs caused by tortious behavior. With its 
strong overlay of moral obligation, and the annulment of a 
wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, the corrective justice approach 
posits that tort's principal raison d'etre is to return parties suffering 
personal physical injury or property damage due to another's 
tortious conduct to the status quo ante, at  least insofar as money 
damages can so do.30 
The more recently developed approach is one of economic 
efficiency, an evaluation that seeks to demonstrate that the 
appropriate measure of the success, or failure, of tort law ought to 
proceed under an economic analysis. Richard Posner and others 
call for a scientific ethic of efficiency, a so-called efficiency norm?' 
Many have responded to  this call, with one commentator concluding 
that "much (though by no means all) of modern tort law is at  least 
29 UCurrently there are two major camps of tort scholars. One understands tort liabiility 
as an instrument aimed largely a t  the goal of deterrence, commonly explnined dthin the 
framework of economics. The other looks a t  tort law as a way of achieving corrective justice 
between the parties." Id. a t  1801. 
See genemlly John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419,45455 
(1979) (commending "conception of tort law that rivals the dominant economic onof 
employing "notions of individual moral responsibility. . . logically excluded from the latter"); 
Matthew S. O'Connell, Correcting Corrective Justice: Unscmmbling the Mired Conception 
of Tort Luw, 85 GEO. L.J. 1717,1717 (1997) (aGenerally accepted theories of tort lnvr can be 
divided into two classes: instrumental theories, which view social cost and efficiency as the 
essential factors in evaluating rights and duties under the law, and noninstrumentd 
theories, which view law as the vindication of a scheme of morn1 rcisponsibilitytatU). 
30 See JULES L. C O W ,  RISKS AND WRONGS 197 (1992) (noting that one of two ways 
of "understanding tort law . . . emphasizes its role in rectifying for vmng done"). 
31Seegenemlly Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Eficiency Norm 
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HO-L. REV. 487 (1980) (discussing efficiency norm rind 
wealth maximization). 
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roughly consistent with . . . economic analysis."32 
Analytically distinguishable from these two approaches is the 
question of how to go about evaluating whether any given tort rule 
is socially beneficial as that term is defined by either (or both) of 
these constructs. Several observers have described forbearance of 
pure self interest as a touchstone of social obligation, with such 
forbearance operating to encourage positive and productive 
behavior and to discourage harmful or wasteful activity. That view 
suggests that all of tort law can be seen as an interlocking check 
against and its too-frequent concomitant, the placement 
of one's interest above the interests of others.34 Instrumentalists 
(or functionalists), be they corrective justice advocates or efficiency 
advocates, strive to identify effective "substantive ambitions or 
32 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really 
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377,381 (1994). A deep reservoir of scholarly criticism is directed, 
however, a t  efforts to identify one ascendant model of analysis to the exclusion of othors. 
E.g., David G. Owen, The Mom1 Foundations of Products Liability Law: Towurd First 
Principles, 68 NOTFCE DAME L. REV. 427,433 (1993) ("Probably the clearest examplo of such 
a single-value model is the theory of economic efficiency, which is often offered ns tho solo 
explanatory or justificatory basis for a particular legal doctrine, an entire legnl fiold, or ovon 
all of law."). 
33 Cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 15 (1945) ("Civilizntion 
checks impulse not only through forethought, which is a self-administered check, but nlso 
through law, custom, and religion."). 
Of the role of nonimmediacy in the development of duty, Russell further observed: 
The civilized man is distinguished !?om the savage mainly by prudence, or, 
to use a slightly wider term, forethought. He is willing to endure present 
pains for the sake of future pleasures, even if the future pleasures are rather 
distant. . . . True forethought only arises when a man does something 
towards which no impulse urges him, because his reason tells him that ho 
will profit by it a t  some future date. 
Id. 
A personal responsibility predicate to action, including action not dependent upon n 
circumspect evaluation of the rights of others, was suggested by G.E. Moore in his short 
volume Ethics: 
Our theory holds, then, that a great many of our actions are voluntary in tho 
sense that we could have avoided them, if, just beforehand, we had chosen to 
do so. It does not pretend to decide whether we could have thus chosen to 
avoid them; it only says that, if we had so chosen, we should hnve succeeded. 
G.E. MOORE, ETHICS 16 (undated). 
Cf. David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 Gk L. REV. 703,720 (1992) ("Equality as n socinl 
ideal may be deiined in many ways, but within a free society may perhaps best bo defined 
. . . as requiring an 'equality of concern and respect' for the interests of other persons." 
(citation omitted)). 
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purposes" in the law:' or, put differently, a causal connection 
between application of a rule of law and some beneficial effect upon 
social and business behavior.36 A successful functional or instru- 
mental rule wil l  create incentives for socially acceptable behav- 
i~ r .~ '  AS Cardozo put it, LtThe final cause of law is the welfare of 
Thus, there is general agreement that the key to measuring the 
success of tort law, be it statuto~$~ or decisional, and be the 
approach nominally one of corrective justice or one of efficiency, 
35 COLEMAN, supm note 30, a t  200. 
36Ernest Weinrib, however, disputes the modem convention thnt tort principles must be 
validated through a "function" that such principles serve, such as 'efficiency" or 'corrective 
justice." E m  J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRNATE LAW 1-21 (1995). To Pleinrib, tort lnw 
can and should be understood on and within its own terms: n unitmy, self-correcting 
dynamic onto itself, and not dependent upon any external logic or objective. Id. nt 5. 
Weinrib nevertheless argues that Aristotelian concepts of restorntion of equality found 
modem voice in Immanuel Kant's "equal rights" conception of law, nnd thnt the Aristotelinn- 
Rantian philosophical continuum, discussed infm notes 56-60,69-74 nnd nccompmyingtcxt, 
constitute the core precepts of modem corrective justice principles. Id a t  20. In PIcinrjb's 
words: ?Private Law makes corrective justice and Kantian right explicit by nctudizing them 
in doctrines, concepts, and institutions that coherently fit together." Id Thus, even while 
rejecting an explicit "instrumentalistn or, in Weinrib's term, 'functiond~st]" approach to 
doctrinal evaluation, he would agree that application of modern corrective justico principles, 
more often than not, result in just and moral decisions. See id a t  8-16 (describing private 
law's imperatives towards "internal intelligibility," 'coherence: nnd Whry structure," as 
aided by the selfcorrecting processes of appellate review). 
With Weinrib's view, compare RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEhS OF JURISPRUD~CE 29 
(1990): 
Legal rules are to be viewed in instrumental terms, implying contestnbility, 
revisabiity, mutability. "Few rules in our time are so well estnblished that 
they may not be called upon any day to justify their existence ns menns 
adapted to an end. If they do not function, they are disensed. If they ore 
diseased, they need not propagate their bind. . . . In the endless process of 
testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross. . . the tide 
rises and falls, but the sands of error crumble." 
(quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-99, 177, 179 
(1921)). 
In seeming agreement with Weinrib, Holmes described his objectives in hvo key lectures 
anticipating The Common Luw as an effort "to discover whether there is m y  common ground 
a t  the bottom of all liability in tort, and if so, what that ground is." OLIVER PIENDELL 
Horn=, THE Coh lh~o~  LAW 63 (hlark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963). 
" Weinrib's self-imaging private law would achieve l i e  results through its orgnnic 
imperative towards "internal intelligibility? See WEINRIB, supm note 36, nt 8-16 (npplyhg 
internal, rather than functionalist, viewpoint to private law). 
" CARDOZO, supm note 36, a t  66. 
For example, a state codification of a liability standard for design defect. 
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reposes in examination of whether the liability analysis and conclu- 
sion has the ability to influence behavi~r.~' In this Article I will 
employ the orthodox instrumentalist inquiry in evaluating whether 
the three provisions that are the Article's focus have the potential 
to shape behavior in ways that advocates of corrective justice and 
efficiency both view as fa~orable.~' An orientation to  my hypothe- 
sis that the similarities in application and result (although not in 
ideation) between the corrective justice and efficiency approaches 
outweigh the distinctions, and that these similarities will be 
revealed in the evaluation of the new Restatement and Reform Act 
provisions,.may prove helpful. To provide a brief example of the 
application of my theory, I suggest that if there exists any material 
divergence between the effect, in theory and in application, of the 
corrective justice-morality and the efficiency-deterrence analyses, 
such a variance would be manifested in either or both of two 
modern and widely-noted tort claims: (1) the products liability 
claim involving the scalding hot McDonald's coffee; and (2) the 
mass environmental catastrophe arising from the grounding of the 
Exxon Valdez. 
Applying an instrumental or functional standard first to  the 
coffee spill, the applicable tort rule of negligence would be success- 
ful if, following the plaintiffs verdict, fast food restaurants served 
coffee at lower temperatures. Regarding the oil spill, the doctrine 
of public nuisance4' would be considered successful, again from an 
40 COLEMAN, supra note 30, a t  203. Weinrib, again, would agree that whether tho 
objectives were generated externally (the instrumentalist or functionalist approach) or 
internally (Weinrib's contention), all private law is judged ultimately by whether it nchiovos 
a just result between the pahies. WE-, supra note 36, a t  20. 
Even in an environment of imperfect information, as society becomes ever moro familiar 
with the corpus of such private law decisions, and is persuaded, ideally, by its fnirness and 
morality, actors will predictably be influenced (if not directed) in their future behavior by 
their perception of how the civil justice system will resolve future disputes. 
"mnstrumentalists believe that tort law has goals. We can distinguish nmong 
instrumentalists in terms of the goals each believes are appropriate to tort law. Tho 
important dichotomy is between moral and economic instrumentalists." COLEam, supra 
note 30, a t  203. 
'' REsTATEhlENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 821C(1) (1979); see also GERALD W. BOSTON & M. 
STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONhIENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS: CASES, bfATERIAlS AND 
PROBLEMS 46-47, 51-56 (1994) (recognizing importance of special injury requirement for 
public nuisance actions by private individuals); JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING 
TORTS 380-82 (1996) (defining elements of public nuisance); M. STUART MADDEN, TOXIC 
TORTS DESKBOOK 37-38 (1992) (noting that plaintss who sustain special injuries aro ablo 
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instrumental or functional perspective, if, following findings for 
plaintiffs, tanker owners commenced to be more probing in their 
evaluation of the fitness of vessel captains.43 
Taking the hypothetical one step further, the predicted behavior- 
al modification of fast food restaurateurs could be claimed by 
corrective justice and efficiency adherents alike as a validation of 
their respective approaches. From the standpoint of corrective 
justice, and examining only the scalding coffee paradigm, compen- 
sation of the injured patron (1) satisfies tort l ads  victim-compensa- 
tion objecti~e;~ (2) annuls McDonald's unjust enrichment a t  
having cultivated a public perception that its coffee mould remain 
hot longer (certainly a mere luxury) at the social cost of an 
increased risk of scalding incidents;45 and (3) operates to deter 
continued fast food sale of unnecessarily hot coffeeP6 
From an efficiency-deterrence standpoint, imposition of liability 
upon McDonald's would be economically rational as it (1) corrects 
McDonald's market misbehavior at having eluded a protocontract- 
ual agreement with patrons47 (e.g., a sign beneath the Golden 
Arches stating "Scalding Coffee Sold Heren); (2) places liability 
upon the party in the position to most inexpensively detect, and 
perhaps correct, the risk;48 and (3) in purely social cost terms, 
reaches a conclusion that has widespread if not universal approval 
that we assign a greater economic value (in the sense of reduced 
to bring public nuisance actions as individuals rather than as representatives of public). 
" Of course other risk reduction responses would be nvnilnble to vessel owners, such ns 
the double hulling of vessels. The costs of such risk reduction, hovrever, might seem too 
great to achieve the elimination of episodic contaminant spills. 
" See genemUy Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in m s o p m m  
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 159 David G. Owen ed., 1995) (nrying thnt true foundntion of 
tort law is corrective justice, not efficiency theory). 
" Cfi Linda Ross Meyer, Jus t  the Facts?, 106 YALE L.J. 1269, 1299 n.161 (1997) 
(describiig'the difficulty in correlating a defendant's wrong with n victim's hnrmm (reviewing 
DON DFSVEES ET L, EXPLORING m D o h m  OF ACCIDENT LAW T ~ G  THE FACIS 
SERIOUSLY (1996))). Annulment is conceptually distinct from corrective justico in thnt i t  
could occur by civil fine rather than by victim compensation. 
See Schwartz, supm note 32, a t  381-87,403-13 (collecting literature analyzing success 
of tort law in deterring negligent conduct). 
" Cfi Lynn A. Stout,Are Takeover Premiums R e d y  Premiums? afarkt Price, Fair Vabe 
and Corpomte Luw, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990) (examining ex ante and expost models of stock 
pricing). 
See Sharlene W. Lassiter, Fmm Hoof to Hambwgec The Fiction of So/e AfcaL Supply, 
33 W- L. REV. 411,418 (1997) (concluding thnt meat producer is lcnst cost nvoidcr). 
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accident costs) to relatively risk-free egress from fast food lanes 
than we do on the marginal social benefits of a small number of 
additional minutes during which our coffee remains hot?' 
Putting aside any need for agreement with the above premises, 
a like evaluation of the three provisions that are the subject of this 
Article should reveal preliminarily if what may have been a bona 
fide categorical distinction between efficiency and corrective justice 
principles has maintained its originating rationale; or whether, 
instead, the two approaches have with time come into rough 
alignment with one another. The following two Sections describe 
in a concise fashion selected constructs within both the corrective 
justice-morality approach and the efficiency-deterrence position that 
provide a means of comparing and contrasting the chosen Reform 
Act and Products Liability Restatement  provision^.^^ 
B. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE-MORALITY 
In general terms, corrective justice proponents advance the 
proposition that the judiciary should promote a rights-based 
jurisprudence grounded in moral  precept^.^' Even among those 
49 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
M, Application of analytical approaches other than these, such as distributive justico, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Cf: JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73, 179 (1971) 
(stating that justice requires "rnitigatrion ofl the influence of social contingencies and natural 
misfortune on distributive shares" and "an undertaking to regard the distribution of natural 
abilities as a collective asset so that the more fortunate are to benefit only in ways that holp 
those who have lost out"), discussed in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COIIWLEX 
WORLD 54 (1995); Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to 
Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515 (1992) (reviewing different analytical constructs, 
including that of distributive justice). 
See Vincent A. Wellman, Conceptions of the Common Law: Reflections on a Theory of 
Contract, 41 U. L. REV. 925,925 n.l(l987) (citing RONALD WORKIN, TAKING RIUIITS 
SERIOUSLY 1-130 (rev. ed. 19771, in which Dworkin "propound[sl a rights-based theory of law 
and a corresponding obligation ofjudges to consider moral precepts when deciding significant 
cases"). Compare the following assertion made by Immanuel Kant: 
I assume that there are pure moral laws which determine, purely a priori, 
(without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness) what is and is not 
to be done, that is, which determine the employment of the freedom of a 
rational being in general; and that these laws command in an absolute 
manner (not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empiricnl 
ends), and are therefore in every respect necessary. 
1 h l h ~ ~ ~ L  I(ANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 636-37 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., 1965). 
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observers who would not subscribe wholeheartedly to this proposi- 
tion, there is probably a consensus that if moral precepts are not to 
be the primary values supported, justice and morality-based goals 
still form part of the foundation of modern tort lawss2 
The moral authority of any law turns upon the perception that 
its tenets lead to just results.53 Most contemporary observers 
would agree that a core consideration in any modern contemplation 
of "justice" would be the goal of "corrective" justice, i.e., a result 
that to the extent possible deprives the wrongful party of his gain, 
and restores the injured party to the position he enjoyed before the 
harm." Holmes explained: "Be the exceptions more or less 
numerous, the general purpose of the law of torts is to secure a 
52 It is agreed generally that only a wrong can transgress a m o d  imperative, in the 
sense that a harm befalling a plaintiffwith no predicate negligence or violntion of some other 
doctrinal imperative, such as l iabi ty  for abnormally dangerous nctivities, creates no 
rectiiicatory duty of any actor. Weinrib might point to tort doctrine as common Inw in which 
wrongdoing is a necessary, but not individually sufficient, component of linbility. See hfnrtia 
k Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and Motive.- A Descriptive hfodel of the Development of Tort 
Doctrine, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231,1240 (1990) CMrongdoing of a party is an essential fnctor 
in the decision to impose liabity.  . . ? (citing Ernest J. Weinrib, The hiorality of Tort Lav?, 
Address to the Tort Law Section, Association of American Law Schools Annual hieeting (Jnn. 
9, 1988))). Cf. HENRY SU~INER hlAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WlTH THE EARLY 
~ R Y  OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO ~ ~ [ O D E R N  IDEAS 127 (1866) (Suggesting that in 
primitive times, before individuals were generally bnceived as altogether separate" from 
family or community, "[tlhe moral elevation and moral debasement of the individunl appear 
to be confounded with, or postponed to, the merits and offen[s]es of the group to tvhich the 
individual belongs"). 
" See READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 37 (Jerome Hall ed., 1938) ('As Auystine snys (Do 
Lib. Arb i5), that which is not just seems to be no law a t  alk wherefore the firce of a law 
depends on the extent of its justice? (emphasis added)); cf. Randy E. Bamett, Getting 
Nonnative: The Role ofNaturalRi9hts in Constitutiod Adjudication, 12 CONST. C O W  93, 
105-13 (1995) (arguing that for constitutional procedures to be legitimate, they must be of 
such a nature as to b i d  in conscience). 
" Jules L. Coleman, The Pmctice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF TORT IN??, supm note 44, a t  53 (a[C]orrective justice is the principle thnt those who nre 
responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them, and thnt the core 
of tort law embodies this conception of corrective justice."). 
m e  civil] law nobody overlooks, the rewards and punishments that enforce 
it being ready at hand, and suitable to the power that makes it; vrhic. is the 
power of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and 
possessions of those who live according to its law; and hns power to tolre 
away life, liberty, or goods from him who disobeys . . . . 
John Locke, Theory of Knowledge: Essay Concerning Human U h t a n d i n g ,  in LOCICE: 
SELECTIONS 203 (Sterling P. Lamprecht ed., 1928). 
The term "corrective" in "corrective justice" has been considered synonymous with the 
terms "rectificatory" or "commutative." POSNER, supm note 36, a t  313. 
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man indemnity against certain forms of harm to person, reputation, 
or estate, at  the hands of his neighbors . . . . n55 
Although codification now plays a significant role in products 
liability law, the earliest judicial revelation of corrective justice 
principles was through common-law adjudication. The origins of 
the common law, in turn, can be traced at least from Ar i~ to t l e~~  
and C i ~ e r o ~ ~  through the book of Exodu~.'~ In Book V, chapter 
2 of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is credited with laying the 
cornerstone of the corrective justice principles of today's common 
law.59 Under the Aristotelian corrective principle of diorthotikos, 
or "making straight," at the remedy phase the court will attempt 
65 HOL~~ES, supra note 36, a t  115 (emphasis added). In addition, Henry Maine observes: 
Now the penal Law of ancient communities is not the law of Crimes; it is the 
law of Wrongs, or, to use the English technical word, of Torts. The person 
injured proceeds against the wrong-doer by an ordinary civil action, and 
recovers compensation in the shape of money-damages if he succeeds. . . . 
[AU such Torts] gave rise to an Obligation or vinculum juris, and wore all 
requited by a payment of money. 
W, supra note 52, a t  370. 
56 See generally H.H. JOACHIM, A R I S ~ :  THE NICO~~ACHEAN THICS (D.A. Rees ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1955) (1951). 
Cicero describes with particularity a natural law-corrective justice deterrence objectivo: 
Of all these things about which learned men dispute there is none more 
important than clearly to understand that we are born for justice, and that 
right is founded not in opinion but in nature. There is indeed a true law, 
right reason, agreeing with nature and d i h e d  among all, unchanging, 
everlasting, which calls to duty by commanding, deters from wrong by 
forbidding. 
BENJA~IIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL hw A STUDY 
IN THE HISTORY OF POLFTICAL THOUGHT 5 (1931) (quoting CICERO, DE LEGIBUS 11); see also 
SURYA PRAKASH S m  WHAT IS LAW? 57-58 (1989) (discussing CiceroJs philosophy of law). 
~3 'The earliest reference to punitive damages can be found in Exodus 22:9, where it is 
prescribed that one found guilty of taking another's property be required to pay back doublo 
what was taken." James J. Restivo, Jr., Insuring Punitive Damages, NAT'I. L.J., July 24, 
1995, a t  C1, C1. 
69 [Tlhe law . . . treats the parties as equal, and asks only if one is the author 
and the other the victim of iqjustice or if the one inflicted and the other has 
sustained an injury. Injustice in this sense is unfair or unequal, and the 
endeavor of the judge is to equalize it. 
ARISTOTLE, NlCOhWHEAN ETHICS 154 (J. Welldon trans., 19871, discussed in David G. Owen, 
The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 AWL L. REV. 705, 707-08 & n.6 (1989). 
Jeremy Waldron has suggested that assignment of this important concept to Aristotle rests 
upon a slender reed, stating that "the attribution is based on a rather free and simplistic 
translation of a very obscure passage . . . in the Nicomachean Ethics." Jeremy Waldron, 
Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, 
supra note 44, at  387, 392 (citing A R I s m ,  NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 114-17 (1V.D. Ross 
trans., 1954). 
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t o  equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away 
fiom the gain of the assailant. For the term "gain" is 
applied generally to such cases, even if it be not a term 
appropriate to certain cases, e.g. to  the person who 
inflicts a wound-and 'lossn to the sufferer. . . . frlhe 
judge restores equality . . . . 60 
Concepts of "natural law" likewise provide a tie between 
corrective justice and considerations of morality. One of the three 
alternative delinitions of natural law offered by Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright, Jr., was that "natural law" comprised "principles of right, 
principles which are established or which should be established if 
justice is to prevail.*' The "morality" backdrop of natural law 
was noted by Posner in his characterization of "natural la# as 
"basic political morality.*2 
As a corollary to its rectificatory goal of setting matters straight 
between the parties, the corrective justice model sets forth the 
broader societal objective of reducing the occurrence of similar 
wrongs in the future. The corrective justice objective of deterrence 
is evidenced in such early writings as that of one academic author, 
who in 1890 wrote of the goals of the negligence action in these 
words: 
The really important matter is to adjust the dispute 
between the parties by a rule of conduct which shall do 
justice if possible in the particular case, but which shall 
also be suitable to the needs of the community, and tend 
2 THE COBIPLETE WORKS OF ARISrOTLE 1786 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). "It is for 
this reason also," Aristotle continues. "that i t  is called just [dihaion], because i t  is a division 
into two parts [di.] . . . and the judge [dikasfes] is one who bisects [dichostesl . . . . 
Therefore the just. . . consists in having an equal amount before and aher the transaction." 
Id. a t  1787. Seegenemlly EFSTEIN, supm note 50, a t  91  (asserting thnt tort limy "deals with 
how to protect the things that you have"); Richard W. Wright, Substantive Correctiue Justice, 
77 IOWA L. REV. 625 (1992) (discussing varied concepts of corrective justice). 
WRIGHT, supra note 57, a t  3; see also &I. Stuart hfadden, The Vital Common Lam Its 
Role in a Statutory Age, 16 U. ARK. ROCK L.J. 555,572 (1996) ( d i s a s i i g  PlrighM 
alternative dehitions of natural law). 
POSNEFt, supra note 36, a t  230. 
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to prevent like accidents fkom happening in the fu- 
t ~ r e . " ~ ~  
Critics of the corrective justice model turn regularly to  the 
argument that a corrective justice-morality model does little to 
reduce accident costs as it does not deter risk-creating behavior in 
any material way,64 if for no other reason than that risk-creating 
behavior resulting in no harm conventionally triggers no penalty 
for the actor. Upon closer examination, however, devaluation of the 
deterrence effect of the corrective justice-morality principles is 
overstated. Even those who question the level of the deterrent 
effect of tor t  law65 concede that it delivers a "moderate amount of 
deterren~e."~~ Thus, as the quantum of deterrent effect of correc- 
tive justice principles will continue to be que~tioned,~' sound 
arguments can be made that tort law's corrective justice attributes 
carry with them a strong incentive to beneficial conduct, or put 
another way, a deterrence to substandard conduct. The decisional 
law with virtually no dissent repeats a deterrence role in accident 
law, without specifically assigning this result to  the operation of 
either corrective justice or efficiency principles.68 When those 
63William Schofield, Davies v. Mannr Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARV. L. REV. 
263,269 (1890); accord Barrett v. Superior Court (Paul Hubbs Constr. Corp.), 272 Cd. Rptr. 
304,308 (Ct. App. 1990) (interpretingterm "wrongful actmin wrongful death statuto to mean 
tortious ad). The Barrett court commented further that by choosing not to limit the measure 
of damages, "California has chosen 'to strengthen the deterrent aspect of tho civil sanction: 
"the sting of unlimited recovery. . . more effectively penalize[sl the culpable defondnnt and 
deterrs] it and others similarly situated from such future condud" '. . . rather than to protect 
defendants from excessive financial burdens." Barrett, 272 Cal Rptr. a t  308 (citations 
omitted); see also Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283,291 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(stating one principal purpose of strict liability was "to provide an economic incontivo for 
improved product safety"). 
See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort 
Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1601 (1997) C"'n demanding that the tortfeasois 
payment go to the tort victim-rather than the state, for example-corrective justice remains 
distinct f?om deterrence."). 
65 E.g., Schwartz, supra note 32, a t  379. 
Id. 
Id.; cf: Wright, supra note 60, a t  626 (noting disagreement on effects of corroctivo 
justice principles). 
See, e.g., Barrett, 272 Cal. Rptr. a t  309-10 (noting that one purpose of strict liability is 
"to provide an economic incentive for improved product safety" and that allowing heirs to 
recover under strict liability would operate "to deter foreseeable wrongful conduct and to 
allocate the cost of iqjury"); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 k 2 d  106,111 (N.J. 1996) (Tho god 
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disputing the vitality of a deterrence role achieved by decisions 
tracking corrective justice principles are largely academicians, I am 
inclined to side with the conclusions of the judges who try the cases 
and read the records. 
Furthermore, philosophical support for the incentive effect of 
corrective justice principles can be found in the "categorical 
imperativen or "equal rightsn teaching of Immanuel K~I I~ .~ '  Kant's 
"moral philosophy" "takes as its central theme the idea of self- 
legislated law," i.e., the view that "[tlhe democratic community 
stands in the same relation to the laws it makes as the moral 
individual does to his own self-determined imperatives of ac- 
ti01.1."~' To Kant, "pure reason's first practical function . . . is to 
make us cognizant of the moral law: the paradigm of universaliz- 
ability to which maxims of objectively correct actions would con- 
form.n71 .A law's "universalizability," i.e., its applicability to all 
persons however circumstanced in relationship or in relative 
empowerment, gives rise to an equal rights attribute to Kant's 
philosophy-specifically, Kant's "categorical imperativen: "Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time v d l  
that it should become a universal law.n72 
of deterrence, acknowledged generally to be part of tart larv, is especinlly important in the 
field of products-liabiity law. . . . mhis state has a strung interest in encouraging the 
manufacture and distribution of safe products . . . and, conversely, in deterring the 
manufacture and distribution of unsafe products . . . ."); West Am. Ins. Co. v. Obrding, 451 
k 2 d  239,242-43 (Pa Super. Ct. 1982) (noting @deterrent effect caused by product liability 
suits"); Webb v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 692 k 2 d  343,346 (Vt. 1996) (explaining that 
strict liabiity "protects the consumer . . . by creating an incentive for mnnufacturers to 
produce safe products, . . . or as other courts have stated, a deterrence to producing 
unreasonably dangerous products" (citations omitted)). 
Weinrib suggests, indeed, that Kant's equality precepts represent the essential bridge 
between Aristotelian corrective justice and the modem 'ethiad foundation for tart lavz? 
POSNER, supm note 36, a t  328-29 (discussing Ernest J. Weinrib, Toruard a hforal Theov of 
Negligence Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 37 (1983)). 
Robert Paul WOE, Infroduction to KANT: A COLLU;TION OF C R ~ C A L  nt xxi 
(Robert Paul W O E  ecL, 1967). 
" Paul Dietrichson, What Does &nt Mean by 'Acting from Duty?, in KAhT: A 
COLLECPION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS, supm note 70, a t  314. 
" Immanuel Rant, Ground& for the Metaphysics of hfomls, in ETHIOU. PHILOSOPHY 1. 
30 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983) (1785); accord I ~ ~ ~ W L K A ~ T ,  THE 
M~APHYSICAL ELE~IENTS OF JUSTICE 35 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (3Ience the universal lavr 
of justice is: a d  externally in such a way that the free use of your rvill is compatible viith 
the freedom of everyone . . . ."I. 
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Paul Dietrichson writes that "the legality' requirement of 
[Kant's] categorical imperative [is satisfied] if and only if our action 
is such that we could at any time consistently want a universal 
causal law of voluntary action to become modeled on the principle 
of our maxim of action."73 Unanswered in this proposition is the 
following question: What constitutes our incentive to  conform our 
behavior to  a premise of moral law categorically or universally 
applied? Kant seemingly suggests that our objectively correct 
conduct can spring not exclusively from subjective fidelity to duty 
("from duty"), but likewise "according to duty," which is to say from 
a "prudential" or pragmatic motivation or incentive.74 And what 
is a pragmatic motivation or incentive but a deterrent from 
pursuing incompatible behavior? 
A conspicuous component of tort law is its rich array of objective 
standards of conduct, in effect Kantian "duties." While Kant 
attributes the relationship between law and behavior to each 
person's internal sense of duty, the Legal Realist or Legal Pragma- 
tist analysis suggested by Holmes departs from this explanation. 
Under this alternate approach, tort  law's imposition of external 
standards of conduct serves less to buy, affect or co-opt the moral 
position of the population than to put persons on notice of the 
behavior expected of them to avoid liability. In Holmes's words: 
The true explanation of the reference of liability to a 
moral standard . . . is not that it is for the purpose of 
improving men's hearts, but that it is to give a man a 
fair chance to avoid doing the harm before he is held 
responsible for it. It is intended to reconcile the policy 
of letting accidents lie where they fall, and the reason- 
able freedom of others with the protection of the individ- 
ual from injury?' 
xi Dietrichson, supra note 71, at 315-16. 
"Id. at 316. As Dietrichson elaborates: 
An example [of prudential motivation] would be when a merchant abstains 
from cheating his customers because, and only because, he thinks cheating 
would be too risky for him. But Kant insists that any human being who can 
properly be called a person knows his actions should satisfy, not only tho 
requirement of legality (objective correctness), but also the requirement of 
morality (subjective worthiness). 
Id. 
" Horn=, supra note 36, at 115. 
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Just what is Holmes's "fair chance to avoid" behavior so as not to 
be held responsible for it? In tort, for example, the triggering event 
for imposition of responsibility for another's loss begins with 
"knowledge" as the "starting-point," followed by examination of the 
"circumstances" that %auld have led a prudent man to perceive 
danger, although not necessarily to foresee the specific harm."76 
What are such "circumstancesn-Holmes asks-and answers, 
L( experien~e."~~ 
On a higher level of generality, corrective justice principles in 
tort are intended to minimize not only the personal physical injury 
effect of accidents but also to lessen the intrusions such accidents 
work upon others' autonomy and liberty interests. Corrective 
justice is suited to mediation of claims arising from unconsented-to 
intrusions upon personal autonomy and wrongfid interference with 
individual freedom. Personal autonomy is stated repeatedly to be 
part of that bundle of modern citizenship rights, the perimeters of 
which law should mediate.78 A dictionary defines "autonomy" as 
"independence or freedom."79 If to "freedom" we add the correla- 
tive right of "liberty," which has been defined as "freedom f?om 
external control or interference, obligations, etc.; freedom to 
choose,"s0 Richard Epstein argues that among the first "task[sln 
of a common-law doctrine such as torts "is to define the boundaries 
of individual liberty."81 In other common-law precincts, such as 
the laws governing private property, preservation of an actor's 
interests in liberty and freedom are recognized and justified as an 
enhancement of the owner's "reasonable autonomy."= 
76 Id at 117. 
Id. 
78 E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 363 (Tex. 1993) CDuggert, J., 
dissenting) ('The requirement that manufacturers provide adequate vmrning serves the dud  
goals of tisk reduction and the protection of individud autonomy in dedsion-making.' 
(quoting PAGE mEMN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TEIE LAW OF TORTS 8 96, at 685 
(5th ed. 1984)); see also in@ notes 149-166 and accompanying text (describing wnrning 
requirements of Restatement (Second) of Torts and Products Liabilify Restatement and 
purpose of those requirements as allowing individuals to make informed choices). 
19 THE%ANDOII¶ HOUSE COLLEGE D I ~ O N A R Y  92 (Jess Stein ed., rev. ed. 1975). 
80 Id. a t  772. 
Richard k Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,203 (1973). 
* JOHN M ~ X E L L  FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGIFIS 173 (19801, discussed in 
David G. Owen, Products Liability: Principles of Justice for the 21st Century, 11 PACE L. 
REV. 63,65 & n4 (1990); cf. EPSTEIN, s u p m  note 50, a t  92: T h e  primnry objective of tho tort 
law is to allow people to live in peace (if not in harmony) with each other. It edorces the 
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In The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz writes that "[alutonomy 
requires that many morally acceptable options be available to a 
person,"83 a standard that imposes limitations upon an actor's 
prerogatives to trammel such "morally acceptable" options as may 
be available to those affected by the actor's conduct. By way of 
example, imagine that workers compensation laws precluded not 
only negligence-based suits against the employer, but also claims 
against a manufacturer or seller of an industrial product that 
carried inadequate warnings or instructions. Assume further that 
such inadequate warnings were the legal cause of a worker's toxin- 
related injuries. If one were to take into account the fact that for 
most, nonemployment as opposed to employment is not a true 
option, the typical worker would be left in some measure coerced 
into tolerating the risk. Thus, the ex ante maintenance of a 
hazardous workplace would be, according to Raz, an invasion of or 
constriction of the worker's autonomy interests. 
The same analysis applies beyond the industrial product context, 
in the area of consumer sales. In evaluating a seller's autonomy or 
liberty interests, the effect of the seller's conduct on the buyer's 
correlative autonomy and liberty interests must be determined. A 
product sold with inadequate warnings would breach the buyer's 
automony interests by denying him the opportunity to  make an 
informed choice as to whether the benefits enjoyed in encountering 
a risk exceeded the potential negative consequences. In the view 
of the reasonable purchaser, therefore, sale of a defective and 
unreasonably dangerous product would be a violation of an 
autonomy interest to which corrective justice principles would 
properly respond. 
Our society's commitment to protecting individual autonomy and 
liberty is expressed in the earliest of our legal system's organizing 
principles in the Con~titution.~~ As society has recognized a 
fundamental right to pursue lawful activity without wrongfid 
interference of others, it has recognized similarly the right to do so 
separate domains in which all of us, singly, can live our own lives as we see fit." 
JOSEPH RAZ, RIE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 378 (1986). 
" In his dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (18721, Justico Fiold 
described the import of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of U.S. Constitution Articlo 
IV, Section 2, and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as ensuring that 5vhich of right 
belong[sl to the citizens of all free governments." Id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting). 
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without undue risk of personal physical harm. Another's autonomy 
or liberty interest extends, as it were, to the tip of your nose and no 
farther. Epstein explains: "Elhe law of tort does not end with the 
recognition of individual liberty. Once a man causes harm to 
another, he has brought himself within the boundaries of the law 
of tort."85 Congruently, a tort rule that gives notice that an actor 
may be liable in money damages for behavior that proceeds without 
due care for the autonomy interests of others, and that causes 
damage or injury thereby,. serves the deterrence objective of 
corrective justice, noted by Holmes, of giving the actor a "fair 
chance to avoid."s6 
In sum, in any evaluation of corrective justice, considerations of 
fairness are intehvined with those of autonomy and freedom. 
Fairness may have an individual or a collective focus. While a tort 
rule's impact upon aggregate fairness may bear upon society's 
perception of its corrective justice focuses primarily upon 
making specific injured parties whole, i.e., in reaching a fair and 
just result as to the parties before the court. Simply put, "the loss 
of fkeedom for some is [not] made right by a greater good shared by 
~ the r s . "~  To Gregory C. Keating, "[ilf 'the concept and language 
of justice [are] the test . . . by which any area of law must be 
judged,' then within the law of enterprise liability, the principle of 
fairness must have priority over the policy of wealth-maximiza- 
ti01.1."~~ 
C. EFFICIENCY-DETERRENCE 
Economic analysis of tort law is not limited to one analytical 
construct. One vantage point from which an economic observation 
Epsteii, supm note 81, at 204. Epstein continues: 
It does not follow, however, that he will be found liable in each and every 
case in which it can be show[n] that he caused harm, for it may still be 
possible for him to escape liability, not by an insistence u p n  his freedom of 
action, but upon a specific showing that his conduct was either excused or 
justiiied. 
Id. 
as Horns,  supm note 36, at 115. 
87 E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,871 (N.Y. 1970) (noting public 
law and private law initiatives regarding air pollution). 
BS Gregoly C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 hUCH. 
L. REV. 1266,1379 & 11.257 (1997) (citation omitted). 
g3 Id  at 1379-80 (citation omitted). 
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of products liability rules may be made, known as "utilitarian 
theory," invites the assessment of the relative social cost associated 
with favoring one course of conduct over another. Coase, with his 
example of the physician and the confe~tioner,~~ prompts applica- 
tion of utilitarian theory to the products liability context, in which 
the question might be posed this way: Is it worthwhile to restrict 
or encumber product availability in order to achieve marginally 
safer products, or, considering social cost, is it preferable to ensure 
a broader range of products, conceding that more products with 
marginally higher potential for harm will exist in the market? 
Thus seen, much of modern tort policy disagreement, be it de- 
scribed theoretically or in terms of tor t  rules' practical effect on 
plaintiffs and defendants as a whole, concerns how much social and 
economic cost we are prepared to incur in order to maintain product 
a~ailability.~' 
See Coase, supm note 49, a t  13 (in setting where confectioneis operation causes 
disturbance to physician's practice, appropriate question not who should componsnto 
physician in nuisance, but rather whether social costs and gains are best served by 
preservation of status quo, by cessation of confectioneis activities, or by cessation of 
physician's activities). 
Perhaps on an inchoate level, the congressional authors of the Reform Act appreciated 
the need for an obeisance directed towards efficiencies over and above statements required 
to accompany federal legislation. Illustrative of such an efficiency-conscious justification is 
found in the authors' apparent conclusion that only economic benefits will flow from tho 
proposed legislation. In the report accompanying the Reform Act, it is claimed: 
REGULATORY WACT S ATEMENT 
In accordance with paragraph ll(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of 
the Senate, the Committee provides the following evaluation of the regulatory 
impact of the legislation, as reported. 
NUMBER OF PERSONS AFFECl'ED 
The purpose of this product liability reform legislation, as reported, is to 
provide greater certainty as to the rights and responsibilities of all thoso 
involved in product liability disputes, to reduce transaction costs, to reliavo 
the burden imposed on interstate commerce by the present product liability 
litigation system, and to ensure the continued availability of biomaterials for 
implantable medical devices. It is anticipated that it will affect the conduct 
of those involved in product liability disputes by making a number of 
significant changes in the laws that are applicable to all product liability 
actions. This legislation does not change the jurisdiction of state or federal 
courts. Thus, the number of persons affected should be consistent with 
current levels. 
ECONOMIC IMPACT 
It is anticipated that this legislation will result in substantial cost and 
paperwork savings to all parties affected by product liability lawsuits. First, 
Heinonline - -  32 Ga. L. Rev. 1 0 4 0  1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8  
19981 CORRECTNE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY 1041 
Another perspective that has played an ascendant role in modern 
economic analysis of tort law involves the concepts of 'tvealth 
maximization" and "efficiency," and the relationship befmeen them. 
Michael D. Green describes the 'tvealth maximization"-ueconomic 
efficiency" relationship in these terms: "By economic efficiency [is 
meant] maximizing total societal resources, without concern for the 
distribution of those resources among members of ~ o c i e t y . ~  
With no presumption of stating more than the sparest outline of 
the efficiency approach to  accident liability law, one of its most 
noteworthy constructs has been to "emphasize [tort lam's] role in 
substituting for efficient contractual exchange.* To illustrate 
this approach, Posner has enlisted the law of battery-the common- 
law rule concerning liability for h d  or offensive touching. 
Quite apart from the corrective justice, moral and fairness attri- 
butes of tort liability for battery, the law and economics argument 
states that the doctrine should "dete[r] persons from engaging in 
activities that a reasonable person would view ahead of time to be 
socially wasteful."94 
Posner illustrates with the decision in Garratt v. Dailey;' 
remembered as the case in which the nearly six-year-old Dailey 
the legislation will bring greater predictability to this area of the low, and, 
thus, save time and money for manufacturers, product sellers and consumers 
alike, each of whom will be able to determine their rights mom readily thnn 
under current law. The legislation should also foster product innovation and 
enhance the competitive position of U. S. product mnnufacturers in viorld 
markets. 
PRIVACY 
S. 648 will have no adverse impact on the personal privacy of the 
individuals or businesses affected. 
PAPERWORK 
S. 648 creates no new regulations and imposes no additional regulatory 
reguirements a t  either state or the federal level. The legislation \rill not 
change the jurisdiction of state or federal courts. 
S. REP. NO. 10532, a t  24-25 (1997). 
92 Michael D. Green, Negligence =Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 
1607 11-12 (1997) (citing Richard A. Posner, Wealth Aiaximization and Judicial Dccision- 
Making, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 131,132 (1984)). 
93 COLE~~AN, supra note 30, a t  197. 
%JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR ET L, THE TORTS PROCESS 29-30 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMC ANALYSIS OF b W  206-11 (4th ed 1992)). 
95 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955). 
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pulled away the lawn chair as his, until that point, affectionate 
aunt was in the process of sitting down?6 Tort liability in battery 
would serve the efficiency objective, its proponent would argue, 
irrespective of whether Dailey received any psychological or 
material benefit from the act. If the harm to the aunt exceeded any 
benefits to Dailey, a simple utilitarian analysis would support 
imposition of liability. If, on the other hand, Dailey derived 
benefits that exceeded any physical or emotional injury to his aunt, 
pulling out the chair was wasteful or inefficient. Why wasteful? 
Because the transaction (the act and the harm) without the aunt's 
consent could, and probably did, generate substantial accident 
costs, not the least of such costs being a sizeable litigation pro- 
cess." In Posner's words, such torts: 
involve . . . a coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant 
occurring in a setting of low transaction costs. Such 
conduct is inefficient because it violates the principle 
. . . that where market transaction costs are low, people 
should be required to use the market if they can and to 
9 98 desist from the conduct if they cant. 
Posner concludes that such bypassing of the market is inefficient 
and therefore should create liability in tort?' Transferred to  a 
products liability context, what of the seller of a defective product 
that causes personal physical injury or property damage? Econo- 
mists might recast the corrective justice goals of encouraging 
individual autonomy and liberty to efficiency-based objectives 
phrased in terms of discouraging involuntary transfers of wealth, 
g6 Id. a t  1092. 
'' Studies reveal that the more complex the litigation, the greater proportion tertiary 
accident costs bear to aggregate victim compensation. For example, a Rand Institute for 
Civil Justice study demonstrated that victims receive 52% of total litigation expenditures in 
automobile tort cases; 43% innonautomobile litigation, such as products liability and medical 
malpractice claims, and 37% in asbestos cases. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET U., TRENDS IN 
TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISPICS 27-28 (19871, discussed in Robert L. 
Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing Pattern of SocioLegal Change, 23 VAL. U.  L. REV. 
1, 16 (1988). For a definition of primary, secondary and tertiary 'accident costs," seo noto 
103, infia. 
POSNER, supra note 94, a t  208. 
99 Id. a t  207-09. 
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market avoidance,100 or imposition of negative e~ternalities.'~' 
A product purchaser has a societally-countenanced expectation, the 
argument goes, that the product will not create an unreasonable 
risk of harm if used for its reasonably foreseeable p~rpose . '~  
Should the product prove dangerously defective, and should the 
purchaser be injured or his property be damaged, the manufacturer 
has, in a sense, subverted the market and created accident 
costslo3 that might have been avoided had the manufacturer 
lW See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Re/4rm A Theoretical Synthesis, 
97 YALE L.J. 353, 355 (1988) (supposing consumer sovereignty ns dominant objective in 
transactions between contracting parties, under which norm: %e lnvr should reflect the 
preferences of competent, informed consumers regarding risk nllocntiona), discussed in 
Kathryn Dix Sowle, Toward a Synthesis of Product LiabiIiLy Principles: Schuartz's Lfodet 
and the Cost-Minimization AZterMtive, 46 U. hiwin L. REV. 1 ,9  (1991). 
lo' Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil (seldom a criminal) vmng. Such n vmng 
occurs when one party, usually unintentionally. destroys another party's 
initial entitlement by imposing a negative externality on him. The courts can 
then provide a remedy in the form of damages. When externalities result in 
the forcible taking of initial entitlements-for example, when n slnughter- 
house pollutes the air of the surrounding neighborhood-liability rules can 
be invoked. Concomitantly government assumes responsibility for the 
imposition of objectively determined compensation and its prompt payment 
to the party harmed. 
WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONO~~CS: AN I N T R O D U ~ R Y  ANALYSIS 127 (1979). 
See PRODUCTS LIABILITY REsrATEhBNT, supm note 1, 5 2 Reporters' Note, cmt. a 
(=[S]trict liabiity has been justified on fairness grounds because the product containing n. 
hidden manufacturing defect that causes harm disappoints the consumer's or user's 
reasonable expectations with regard to safety." (citing, inter din, F. Pntricli Hubbard, 
Recrsonnble Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability /or 
Defective Products, 29 ~ ~ % R C E R  L. REV. 465 (1978); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational 
Theoly of Consumer Protection. Doctrine, Function and Legal Liabitily for Product 
Disappointment, 60 Vk L. REV. 1109 (1974))). 
lC3 See CALABRESI, COSIS OF ACCIDENTS, supm note 22, a t  35-129 (discussing loss 
spreading, general deterrence, and specific deterrence approaches to accident cost reduction). 
Stephen Sugarman has summarized Calabresi's cost-avoidance philosophy: 
In The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi argued that society's policy towords 
accidents should be to minimize the sum of primary, secondnry, m d  tertinry 
accident costs. Reducing primary costs concerns promoting snfety (while not 
discouraging, if possible, socially desirable innovation). Reducing secondary 
costs concerns spreading the costs of compensation pnid to nccident victims. 
Tertiary costs are the transactions costs; these costs include the costs of 
lawyers' fees, insurance administration, the parties' time, and court costs. 
Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163,1167 (1992) (review 
essay). 
Jules Coleman further explains the three types of costs attributable to personal injury or 
property damage torts: 
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simply bargained for pertinent product-related rights. 
What rights might have been bargained for? It has been 
suggested that actual bargaining regarding the cost a product user 
might assign to, for example, loss of vision in one eye due to a 
defect in protective eyewear, would engender problems in arriving 
at a valuation. Moreover, the reliability of such a valuation, even 
if it could be agreed to preliminarily, might make an actual 
contractual objective infeasible.lo4 
Perhaps the best substitute for an actual-bargained-for exchange 
is a circumstance in which a buyer fully apprised of pertinent 
safety-related information and instructions for the safe operation 
of a product makes an informed decision to purchase the product 
for the buyer's use or for devotion to  the use of others. Bearing in 
mind the precedent establishing that a warning, however effective, 
cannot vitiate a manufacturer's liability for injury or damage 
caused by a defectively designed product,lo5 such a knowledgable 
consent or choice model for sale of a product with a high risk level 
means, in a proto-contractual sense, that the seller has bargained 
for the right to  sell it. In essence, the seller preserves the transac- 
tion within the market by conveying warnings sufficient to permit 
Primary costs are the dollar equivalent of the damages caused by accidents. 
Secondary costs are the costs of bearing the costs of accidents. These are tho 
costs associated with the various schemes for distributing the primary (and 
tertiary) costs of accidents. Secondary costs are reduced when they are 
spread maximally over persons and time, or when they are borne by those 
individuals in the best position to bear them. Tertiary costs are the 
administrative costs of any system, including the tort system, for determining 
v~ho should bear the costs of accidents. 
COLEMAN, supra note 30, a t  204. 
lW Calabresi and Melamed describe the difficulty of actually bargaining for product- 
related rights: 
If we were to give victims a property entitlement not to be accidentally 
injured we would have to require all who engage in activities that may injure 
individuals to negotiate with them before an accident, and to buy the right 
to knock off an arm or a leg. Such pre-accident negotiations would be 
extremely expensive, oRen prohibitively so . . . . And, after an accident, the 
loser of the arm or leg can always very plausibly deny that he would have 
sold it a t  the price the buyer would have offered. 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1108-09 (19721, discussed in HIRSCH, 
supra note 101, a t  166. 
'" See generally 1 M. STUART MADDEN, P R O D U ~  LIABIL~TY $8.5 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 
1995, with Kathy Seward Northern) (collecting authority). 
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the purchasers to make informed choices whether or not to expose 
themselves to the risk.lo6 Absent a bargain struck with an 
informed purchaser, the sale of a product defective for want of 
adequate warnings, and that proximately causes plaintiffs harm, 
represents an involuntary or coerced transfer of wealth from the 
injured party to  the injurer. 
As the above discussion illustrates, valuation problems cannot 
always be avoided via the warning mechanism; therefore, under an 
economic efficiency tort theory, some method must be employed to 
make such determinations. A primitive but greatly persuasive 
valuative standard was offered in a negligence context by Judge 
Learned Hand in the opinions in United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co.,lo7 and Conway v. 0'Brien.'08 In those two cases, the Sec- 
ond Circuit held that the degree of care appropriate to a given 
action or omission to act should be the result of a three-factor 
calculus: (1) the likelihood that the conduct will injure others, (2) 
multiplied by the seriousness of the risk if it happens, (3) balanced 
against the burden of taking precautions against the risk.lm In 
formula, the calculation is known as B (Burden) < P (Probability of 
Harm) X L (Magnitude of Loss Should It Occur)."O The Learned 
Hand approach can be conformed to a more modern utilitarian 
analysis by visualizing B, or the Burden upon the actor, as 
encompassing not only the particular burden of precautionary 
measures upon the actor, but also the burden upon society if the 
conduct must either be eliminated due to liability rules, or made 
more expensive if the precautionary measures are undertaken."' 
lo6See i n b  notes 149-166 and accompanying text (discussing present m d  proposed tort 
standards for warnin= and ~olicies behind those standards). 
lW 159 F.2d 169, i73 (2dkir. 1947) (involving suit against barge m d  tugboat opentors 
for barge's sinking). 
las 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (involving automobiic accident on nval Vermont 
road), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941). 
log Id.; see also 1 MADDEN, supm note 105, a t  108 (explaining formulntion of three factors 
by Judge Hand). 
"O POSNER, supm note 94, a t  164. 
"' Likewise, in keeping with a utilitarian economic view that trnnscends the concerns of 
the individual plaintiff and defendant, consideration of the factors P (Probability of Hm) 
and the L (Magnitude of the Loss should it  occur) would be enlarged to contemplate the 
likelihood of harm to others identically or similarly situated, and the mngnitude of the 
potential harm, not only in terms of the individual plaintiff but nlso to the population 
exposed to the risk 
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Posner machined the Hand formulation into an efficiency 
principle by explaining that: 
Hand was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an 
economic meaning of negligence. Discounting (multiply- 
ing) the cost of an accident if it occurs by the probability 
of occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit 
to  be anticipated from incurring the costs necessary to 
prevent the accident. . . . If the cost of safety measures 
[including, perhaps, "eliminating the activity"] or of 
curtailment-whichever cost is lower--exceeds the 
benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring 
that cost, society would be better off, in economic terms, 
to forgo accident prevention.l12 
What does the efficiency approach add to the far older utilitarian 
approach?'13 Posner partially harmonized wealth maximization 
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,32 (1972). Posnor 
continues: 
When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational 
profit-maximking enterprise will pay tort judgments . . . rather than incur 
the larger cost of avoiding liability. Furthermore, overall economic value or 
welfare would be diminished rather than increased by incurring a higher 
accident-prevention cost in order to avoid a lower accident cost. . . . 
Perhaps, then, the dominant function of the fault system is to generate 
rules of liability that if followed will bring about, a t  least approximately, the 
efficientthe cost-justified-level of accidents and safety. . . . Because wo do 
not like to see resources squandered, a judgment of negligence has inescap- 
able overtones of moral disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper 
alternative to the accident. . . . Where, [alternatively,] the measures 
necessary to avert the accident would have consumed excessive resources, 
there is no occasion to condemn the defendant for not having taken them. 
Id. a t  33. 
It should be noted that some scholars have speculated about the usefulness, in practice, 
of the BcPL approach. Mark Grady asks whether Posner, and Posner with Landes, ubolievo 
that judges actually refer to economic analysis, or rather that they behave as if they do?" 
GRADY, supra note 26, a t  354 n.1 (citing W ~ I  M. mEs & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOhfIC SmUCruRE OF TORT LAW 85-88 (1987) bereinafter LANDES & POSNER, ECONO~IIC 
STRUC~~RE]). Grady continues: "Did Judge Hand behave as if he knew what thickness of 
barge planks combined with what quantity of whiskey maximizes social wealth?" Id. at  356 
n.2. 
l* See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (describing utilitarian approach). See 
generally James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV, L. REV. 97 (1908) (discussing 
utilitarian nature of old common law which sacrificed individual needs in order to mcot 
reasonable needs of community). 
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with utilitarianism, writing: "mhe economist, when speaking 
normatively, tends to define the good, the right, or the just as the 
maximization of 'welfare' in a sense indistinguishable from the 
utilitarian's concept of utility or happine~s.""~ Stephen G. Gilles 
adds that Posner's "wealth maximization" approach, interpreted as 
requiring a "willingness to pay," might "adopt the same strategy" 
as a "casual utilitarianism" analysis."' To Gilles, "[iln the 
context of negligence cases, . . . differences between the utilitarian 
and wealth-maximization approaches to cost-benefit analysis seem 
to disappear once the decision to employ the reasonable person as 
a heuristic is made. "116 
A leading exponent of the efficiency role of the common law of 
tort  has been Guido Calabresi, who has argued persuasively that 
in matters of compensation for accidents, civil liability should 
ordinarily be laid at the door of the "cheapest cost avoider," the 
actor who could most easily discover and inexpensively remediate 
the hazard. Together with A. Douglas Melamed, and employing the 
setting of environmental harm, Calabresi asserts that consider- 
ations of economic efficiency dictate placing the costs of accidents 
"on the party or activity which can most cheaply avoid them. "117 
1' Richard A. Posner, Utilitdmism, Economics. and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 
103,119 (1979), discussed in Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of 
Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damuges in Tort Inw, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1787,1824 n.121 
(1995). Posner continues: B u t  for my normative purposes I want to define the mnximnnd 
more narrowly, as 'value' in the economic sense of the term or, more clearly I think, as 
'wealth'" Id 
Michael D. Green observes wryly: aAccording to Posner, tort law is m d  hns been 
constructed since the late nineteenth century primarily so as to further economic effiaencyP 
Green, supm note 92, at 1607 1.12. 
Steven G. Gies ,  The Invisible Hand Formda, 80 V k  L. REV. 1015, 1029 (1994) 
(citations omitted). 
Id. a t  103637. 
'I7 Calabresi & bfelamed, supm note 104, a t  1096-91; see also hLwi C. RAHDEKT. 
COVERING ACCIDENT COSIS: ~~suRANcE, LIABILITY, AND TORT REFORM 29, 32-33 (1995) 
(analyzing rationale for insurance and addressing concern that cost-spreading function will 
divert compensatory responsibility away from least cost avoider). 
One frequently-referenced validation of the Yeast cost avoider" cnn be found in Union Oil 
Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), a California coastal oil spill cnse in vhich the 
court allowed commercial fishermen to recover from defendant their business losses caused 
by lost fishing opportunity during a period of pollution. The court found justice and 
efficiency were served by placing responsibility for the loss on the "best cost avoider" Ci this 
setting the defendant oil company), reasoning: 
[Tlhe loss should be allocated to that party who can best correct m y  error in 
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Posner's harmonious observation has been that in the so-called 
alternative care indemnity damage shifting scenario, 'fve do not 
want both tortfeasors to take precautions; we want the lower cost 
accident avoider to do so. n118 
From another, yet still efficiency-influenced perspective, a 
products liability doctrine that passes efficiency muster probably 
would result also in a Pareto superior or even a Pareto optimal 
resolution.11g A rule is Pareto optimal when its effects benefit all 
allocation, if such there be, by acquiring the activity to which the party has 
been made liable. . . . The capacity "to buy out" the plaintiffs if tho burden 
is too great is, in essence, the real focus of Calabresi's approach. On this 
basis there is no contest the defendants' capacity is superior. 
Id. at  570 (citing CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 22, a t  150-52). 
Calabresi and Hirschoff provide a concise description of what the least cost avoidor 
approach requires, both of private parties and of the government: 
The strict liability test we suggest does not require that a government 
institution make . . . a cost-benefit analysis. It requires . . . only n decision 
as to which of the parties to the accident is in the best position to make a 
cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and 
to a d  on the decision once it is made. The question for the court reduces to 
a search for the cheapest cost avoider. 
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Strict Liability, supm note 22, a t  1060. 
POSNER, supra note 94,s 6.8. 
In some settings defendants themselves have sought to employ the cheapest cost nvoidor 
rationale to promote a finding of no liability when a consumer aware of product risks is, tho 
argument goes, the party that can most cheaply avoid the accident costs. See Dowey v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 k 2 d  1239,1254 (N.J. 1990) (discussing defendant's argumont that 
cigarette consumers are cheapest cost avoiders). 
'I9 The Pareto criteria for wealth maximization analysis are summarized in DAVID W. 
BARNES & LYNN k A TOUT, THE ECONOhIIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW 11 (1992): 
A classification scheme designed by Vilfredo Pareto in the early 1900's 
provides one solution to [utility and wealth maximization analysis] and also 
to the analytical difficulties presented by the impossibility of intorporsonal 
utility comparisons. . . . The first application of the Pareto criteria is to 
evaluate the desirability of changes in the distribution of goods. Pareto's 
system allows that evaluation without regard to the desirability of the initial 
distribution among individuals of either their abilities to pay or enjoy and 
without the need for interpersonal utility comparisons. Imagine a socioty in 
which all resources have already been allocated to particular individuals. 
Now imagine a change in allocations that left a t  least one person bettor off 
and no one worse off. Surely that change is desirable from any perspective. 
Economists refer to such a change in the allocation of resources as a Pareto 
superior change. 
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parties, in essence, a win-win proposi t i~n.~~ As summarized by 
Mark Seidenfeld: 
An economic change is considered a Pareto improvement 
[or Pareto superior] if it makes some individuals better 
off without making any person worse off. A state of the 
economic system is Pareto optimal (or Pareto Efficient) 
if there is no Pareto superior state that society can 
reach. If we are using the Pareto criterion to evaluate 
our economic system, we say that a Pareto optimal state 
is "economically efficient. nlZ1 
A sketch of potential Pareto optimal application to a seller's 
warning duties and potential liability can be found in a scenario in 
which an adequate warning accompanies a prescription pharmaceu- 
tical, providing sufficient information concerning risks and benefits 
to  the health care professional. The health profession benefits by 
being able to most reliably and effectively prescribe pharmaceut- 
icals to an appropriate class of patients with a risk that is not 
disproportionate to the therapeutic  reward^.^ Individual pa- 
tients within the class for whom the pharmaceutical is prescribed 
benefit therapeutically, and pharmaceutical companies benefit by 
avoiding the miring inefficiencies and tertiary accident costs of 
protracted civil litigation and regulatory problems associated mith 
well-grounded civil or regulatory claims'of failure to provide 
adequate warnings. 
Id. at 12. 
[Tlhe Pareto principle. . . is that a change Cicluding a change brought a b u t  
by an accident or an  intentional act) is good if it makes a t  lenst one person 
better off and no one worse off. This is a liberal" principle nkin to KnnVs 
and hWs principle that everyone is entitled to as much liberty as b 
consistent mith the liberty of all other people. 
Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philasophical Inquiry. in  
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW. supm note 44. a t  99.104 (citation omitted). 
MARK SEmmmm, ~ ~ I C R O E C O N O ~ ~ C  PREDICATES TOLAW AND ECOXOL~LICS 49 (1996). 
For a general description of Pareto optimality principles, see RBBW PAUL hWLOY. U P 1  AND 
Eco~omcs: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO m O R Y  AND PRACl'ICE (1990). 
=See PRODUCIS LIABILITY RESTATEAENT, supm note 1.5 6 ("Liabiity of Seller or Other 
Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and h l e d i d  Devices?. 
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D. LIMITED EXPLICIT JUDICIAL ADOFTION OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE OR 
EFFICIENCY IDEALS 
Referencing a 1991 American Law Institute Reporters' 
Steven D. Sugarman noted tartly that "one of the last places to find 
lucid thinking about the desirable direction of tort law is in the 
published opinions of state and federal judges. While his 
complaint surely represents hyperbole for effect, Sugarman is 
correct in observing that discussion of tort principles in the 
decisional law is frequently colloquial, with courts often doing no 
more than lumping together as coextensive such objectives as 
expeditious claims resolution, reduced transaction costs, and 
effi~iency.~~ Congressional discussion and fact-finding, in turn, 
frequently have been more polemic than inf0rmati~e.l~~ 
Explicit judicial adoption of the tenets of either corrective justice 
or law and economics has been sporadic, and even where mentioned 
in decided cases, either the expression or the application of the two 
theories is often inexact. An example of a judge's misinterpretation 
of doctrine is the peevish dissent of Judge Doggett in knsporta-  
tion Insurance Co. v. Morie1,12' where a punitive damages award 
was reversed in a suit by an injured worker against the workers' 
compensation carrier, alleging bad faith delay. Referencing the 
majority's caution regarding "overdeterrence," Judge Doggett wrote: 
"Perhaps the majority subscribes to  that perspective which 
maintains that compensatory tort laws should not prevent wrong- 
fully caused injuries, but rather encourage misconduct to the extent 
that its economic benefit outweighs its cost. n128 
lP &ERICA. LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIDILITY FOR 
PERSONAL T N ~ Y  (1991) bereinafter REPORTERS' STUDY]. 
lU Sugarman, supra note 103, at 1165. 
In Posner's words: "Lawyers are not only quick but unashamed to make emphatic 
assertions on matters of fad . . . without attempting, desiring, or even being willing to 
subject those assertions to an empirical test." POSNER, supra note 36, at 70, discussed in 
Philip Shuchman, It Isn't That the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, It's Just That the Tort 
Reformers Are So Wrong, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 485,512 n.136 (1997). 
'2GSee, e.g., supra note 91 (quoting discussion in accompanying Senate Report on effects 
of Reform Act). 
In 879 S.W.2d 10, 38 (Tex. 1994) (Doggett, J., dissenting). 
12' Id. (Doggett, J., dissenting) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 
147-52, 176-77, 191-95 (3d ed. 1986)). 
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Other courts, however, have consciously elevated their jurisdic- 
tion's awareness of economic concepts in fashioning tort law. 
Illustrative is the Third Circuit's decision in Whitehead v. St. Joe 
Lead CO.,~'~ a lead poisoning case in which defendants included 
suppliers of lead to plainws industrial employer. Reversing 
summary judgment for defendants,130 the court observed: 
"mt may well be that suppliers, acting individually or 
through their trade associations, are the most efficient 
cost avoiders." Certainly it could be found to be ineffi- 
cient for many thousands of lead processors to individu- 
ally duplicate the industrial hygiene research, design, 
and printing costs of a smaller number of lead suppli- 
ers.131 
To like effect is the decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court in 
Schneider National, Inc. v. Holland Hitch CO. '~~  There the court 
explicitly relied upon Posner's "alternative care joint tortfeasor" 
evaluation to reach the conclusion that indemnity should not be 
available "where both actors have a Soint care' obligation to avoid 
the injury. The court noted, however, that when the actors' 
culpability varied, i.e., they were not in pari delicto, the higher 
relative fault of one defendant, the "lower cost avoider," would vest 
indemnity rights in the other tortfeasor.13' 
729 F.2d 238 (3d Cr. 1984). 
Id  a t  256. 
"'Id a t  247 (citing, inter alia, Calabresi & Hirschoff, Strict Liability, supm note 22, a t  
1060-61); see also Beauchamp v. Russell, 547 F. Supp. 1191,1197 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 19829 (ating 
with approval proposition that "in apportioning liability behvecn a pnrtrnaker and an 
assembler, the cheapest cost avoider should bear 111 liability" (citation omitted)). 
'32 843 P.2d 561 (nTYo. 1992). 
'= Id. a t  575 (citations omitted). The court also noted enthusiastidly thnt Posner's 
reformulation and expansion of the Learned Hand negligence (nctunlly brench of duty) 
formula in United States v. Camll Towing Co.. 159 F.2d 169. 173 (2d Cir. 19471, 
"demonstrates a rationale for tort law policy choices wvhich is precise and persuasive? Id. 
at 572 a10; see also supm notes 107-111 and accompanying text (describing Hnnd formula). 
" Schneider Nat'l, 843 P.2d a t  575 (citing LANDES & POSNER, Ecolc'osnc STRUCTURE, 
supra note 112, a t  206); see also Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Vlyo. 1986). 
There, the court stated: 
When a defective article enters the stream of commerce and an innocent 
person is hurt, it is better that the loss fall on the manufncturcr, distributor 
or seller than on the innocent victim. . . . They are simply in the best 
Heinonline - -  32 Ga. L. Rev. 1051 1997-1998 
1052 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1017 
In the insurance declaratory judgment context, the dissenting 
opinion in Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insula- 
tions, I~c . , '~~  proposed a "discoverability" rule for triggering 
insurance carrier coverage of asbestos claims, asserting that this 
approach would, relying upon a least cost avoider rationale, provide 
incentives within the insured-insurer relationship that could hold 
the promise of reducing accident costs.'36 Specifically, the dissent 
reasoned that: 
[tlbe more "early" insurers that are liable upon a 
victim's exposure, the more likely it is that the potential 
harm will be discovered and the public warned. If an 
insurer sees that the product poses some risks, he may 
raise premiums accordingly. This may ultimately cause 
the manufacturer to remove the product from the 
market or to give better warnings in order to lower 
insurance premiums. This in turn reduces accident 
Whichever gloss is placed upon economic analysis-its deterrent 
effect, or its ability to reduce accident costs-its concepts can be 
understood "even at the rudimentary level of jurists," at least 
according to Judge Patrick Higgenb~tham.'~~ In Louisiana ex rel. 
Guste v. M\V Testbank,13' a renowned vessel collision case 
involving claims for economic loss not accompanied by physical 
position to either insure against the loss or spread the loss among all 
consumers of the product. 
Ogle, 716 P.2d at  342. 
Ogle was later described by the Wyoming Supreme Court as an indication of how strict 
liability "introduced economic analysis to tort law." Schneider Nat'l, 843 P.2d at  680. Tho 
Schneider Nat'l court proceeded to analogize Ogle's "risk allocationn theory to a *cheapest 
cost avoider" approach. Id. (citing LANDES & POSNER, ECONO~~IC STRU(;TORE, supra noto 
112, a t  5484); Gilles, supm note 115, a t  1306; see also FVilson v. Good Humor Corp., 767 
F.2d 1293, 1306 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (identifying but not pursuing cheapest cost avoidor 
analysis in action brought by parents of child fatally iqjured while crossing street to moot 
ice cream vending truck). 
135 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). 
13"d. at  1230-32 (Memtt, J., dissenting). 
ln Id. a t  1231-32 (Memitt, J., dissenting). 
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M N  Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985). 
Id. 
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damage to  a proprietary interest, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, per Judge Higgenbotham, justified its rehsal to permit 
such recovery (and gave support to the court;'s continued adherence 
to  the economic loss doctrine of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. 
Flint),'* in part upon its reasoning that permitting liability for 
the "unknowable" amounts that might be posed as economic loss 
claims arising fkom any substantial mishap mould erode the 
efficient deterrent effect of such a tort rule, as a rational, wealth- 
maximizing actor mould be unable to guage the optimal precaution- 
ary measures for avoidance of a predictable accident cost.141 
Even without explicit recognition of economic, utilitarian or 
corrective justice concerns, influential decisions have adopted and 
promoted such precepts, sometimes distending these established 
tort principles into ungainly hybrids. In the setting of environmen- 
tal harm, notions of corrective justice and utilitarianism have 
coexisted uneasily for decades. Originally, even the most economi- 
cally powerless landholder could seek and secure an injunction 
against a neighboring activity that interfered substantially with the 
plaintifPs use of property. Numerous early decisions evidenced a 
judicial unwillingness to "balance" injuries, i.e., to weigh the 
defendant's cost and the community hardship in losing the indusfxy 
against the often modest provable harm to plaintiffs ordinarily 
small and noncommercial property. As the New York Court of 
" 275 U.S. 303,309 (1927); see People Express Airlines, Inc v. Consolidated Rnil Corp., 
495 k 2 d  107,109 (N.J. 1985) ('[A] virtually per se rule barring recovery for mnomic loss 
unless the negligent conduct also caused physical harm has evolved throughout this century 
m 
- - . . I .  
14' In Higgenbotham's words: 
That the [economic loss] rule is identifiable and will predict outcomes in 
advance of the ultimate decision about recovery enables it to plny ndditionnl 
roles. Here we agree with plaintiffs that economic analysis, even at tho 
rudimentary level ofjurists, is helpful both in the identificntion of such roles 
and the essaying of how the roles play. Thus it is suggested thnt plncing d 
the consequence of its error on the maritime industry rdl enhance its 
incentive for safety. While correct, as far as such analysis goes, such in 
terrorem benefits have an optimal level. Presumably, when the cost of M 
unsafe condition exceeds its utility there is an incentive to chnnge. A s  tho 
costs of an accident become increasing multiples of its utility, however, there 
is a point at which greater accident costs lose meaning, and the inccntivo 
curve flattens. When the accident costs are added in lorge but unbaorrable 
amounts the value of the exercise is diminished. 
Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029. 
Heinonline - -  32  Ga. L. Rev. 1053 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8  
1054 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW Wol. 32:1017 
Appeals stated in Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper CO.,'~~ not 
granting the small landowner an injunction solely because the loss 
to him, in absolute terms, was less than would be the investment- 
backed loss to the nuisance-creating business and lost employment 
within the community, would "deprive the poor litigant of his little 
property by giving it to those already rich. n143 
In contrast, the modern rule governing injunctions, including 
environmental injunctions, might seem coldly utilitarian. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 936 lists factors for injunction 
issuance which expressly include weighing of 'the nature of the 
interest to be protected,"144 thus presumably inviting an elevation 
of plaintiffs bona fides where the court considers the activity 
meritorious (perhaps a Camp Fire Girls campground) and a 
devaluation where the court deems it less valuable (perhaps an 
automobile scrapyard). Along similar lines, hardship to  the 
defendant of ceasing or changing its activity, and "the interests of 
third persons and of the publicn are proper  consideration^.'^^ 
Representative of such an approach is the result reached in 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement CO.,'~~ which involved a large scale 
and conceded industrial nuisance in the form of airborne cement 
dust emanating from an upstate New York cement plant. In the 
lower court, a nuisance was found, and temporary damages 
awarded, but plaintiffs' application for an injunction was de- 
nied.147 Recognizing that to deny the injunction would depart 
from Whalen's corrective justice, no balancing approach discussed 
above, the court nevertheless adopted a utilitarian approach that 
weighed the hardships imposed upon plaintiffs against the 
economic consequences of the requested injunction. The court 
explained: "The ground for denial of injunction, notwithstanding 
'" 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913). 
'"Id. at 806. By "giving it," the court of course meant by requiring plaintiff to onduro 
ongoing environmental servitudes imposed by defendant. Id. The court in McCleery o. 
Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951 (C.C.D. Utah 19041, reached a comparablo 
corrective justice conclusion and granted the injunction against the defendant's mino and 
smelter. The court held, however, that because complainants delayed in npplying for cm 
injunction, it would only be granted if defendants refused to pay damages. Id. at 955. 
lU RESTATE~TENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936(1)(a) (1979). 
'" Id. 9 936(l)(e)-(g). 
257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
14' Id. at 871-72. 
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the finding both that there is a nuisance and that plaintiffs have 
been damaged substantially, is the large disparity in economic 
consequences of the nuisance and of the injunction. nl48 
111. EVALUATION OF REPRESENTATIVE PROPOSALS THROUGH 
THE HEXJ'RISTIC DEVICE OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE-MORALITY 
AND EFFICIENCY-DETERRENCE 
A. WARNINGS 
1. Generally. Independently of a manufacturer's design or 
manufacturing processes, the seller may be found liable in products 
liability if the product lacks adequate warnings regarding a 
genuine risk of harm or, where appropriate, instructions as to how 
to use the product without an unreasonable risk of harm.14g 
These two informational obligations, i.e., to provide both (1) 
'" Id. a t  872. Legitimate questions may be raised about the m c h  of Boomer. A 
competing conclusion was reached in Little Joseph Realty, Inc v. Toun of Babylon. 363 
N.E.2d 1163,1167-69 (N.Y. 1977), in which the same New York Court of Appeals issued an 
injunction against an asphalt plant operating contrary to zoning ordinances, and distin- 
guished Boomer as a case involving %o zoning violation, or for thnt mntter, [no] violntion of 
any other statute." 
As the Reporters to the Products Liability Restatement explained: 
[c]ommercial products sellers must provide reasonable instructions and 
warnings about risks of injury associated with their products. Instructions 
inform persons how to use and consume products safely. Wnmings de r t  
users and consumers to the existence and nature of product risks so that they 
can prevent harm either by appropriate conduct during use or consumption 
or by choosing not to use or consume. B 
PRODUCTS LJABILITY RE~~ATEMENT, supm note 1,s 2 cmt. i; see, eg., A s k  Indus. v. Sunrer, 
921 S.W-2d 794, 799-800 CTex. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that manufacturer of asphalt 
materials handling system and its successor had duty to warn two nsphdt plant workers 
that supporting part of handleis hopper could become dangerous once worn thin); see also 
Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195,197 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding thnt even tvhero properly 
designed, product may be in unreasonably dangerous condition if mnnufncturer fails to warn 
of latent dangers in products); Ragsdale Bros. v. Magro, 693 S.W.2d 530,536 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1985) (holding that liabiity of seller can extend to nondefective product "plnced in the flovr 
of commerce without adequate warnings of its dangerous propensities or without ndcqunte 
instructions for. . . use"), rev'd on othergrounds, 721 S.W.2d 832 CTeK 1986). 
It was only at the turn of the nineteenth century that buyer-seller tmnsnctions recognized 
any significant departure from the general rule of caveat emptor. Prior to thnt time, the 
dominant rule of law required the purchaser % take care of his o m  interests." Bnrnnrd v. 
Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383,388-89 (1870). 
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adequate warnings; and (2) appropriate  instruction^'^^ derive 
from two policy objectives: (1) risk reduction and reduction of 
accident costs;151 and (2) informed consent.ls2 
The widely-followed approach for many years has been to  
evaluate products liability claims, including warnings claims, under 
both their functional nomenclature (design, manufacture, or 
warnings defects) and their doctrinal category (negligence, warran- 
ty, and strict tort liability).153 In contrast, the "fhctional" analy- 
sis adopted in the Products Liability Restatement promotes 
recognition of a claim of a "warningsgs" defect without regard to 
doctrinal application of negligence, warranty, or strict tort liability 
principles.lM The Products Liability Restatement does not, 
however, change the substantive requirements of warnings 
obligations. 
Be the approach doctrinal or functional, to be adequate under 
any theory of liability, a warning, when necessary, must by its size, 
location, and intensity of language or symbol, be calculated to 
impress upon a reasonably prudent user of the product the nature 
and extent of the hazard inv01ved.l~~ The language used (1) must 
. be direct and should, where applicable, describe methods of safe 
For brevity, the informational obligation of providing adequate warnings and 
instructions may be referred to herein solely as the "warning" obligation. 
l" See generally M. Stuart Madden, Hazard Signs and Products or Toxic Tort Litigation, 
24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 611 (1996) (discussing empirical research into 
effectiveness of hazard signs and how such research should affect legal warning standards). 
''See infia notes 160-166 and accompanyingtext (discussing informed consent objective); 
see also Marshall S. Shapo,A Social Contract Tort, 75 TM. L. REV. 1835,1839 (1997) (noting 
that "the concept of consent. . . bridges tort and contract"). 
'* 1 -DEN, supra note 105,§$10.2-.4 (explaining process of analyzing when legal duty 
to warn arises under these doctrines). 
lM PRODUCTS L I A B ~  RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, 2(c). 
'" In House v. Annour ofAmerica, Inc., 886 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), arising from 
the death of a law enforcement officer whose bulletproof vest was pierced by an assailant's 
bullet, the court held: 
Flor a warning to be adequate, it must completely disclose all the risks 
involved, as well as the extent of those risks. "A warning must (1) bo 
designed so it can reasonably be expected to catch the attention of tho 
consumer, (2) be comprehensible and give a fair indication of the specific risks 
involved with the product; and (3) be of an intensity justified by tho 
magnitude of the risk" The overall adequacy of the warning.. . must bo 
judged in light of the ordinary knowledge common to members of the law 
enforcement community. 
Id. a t  551 (citations omitted). 
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use;156 and (2) must be timely and advise of significant hazards 
from reasonably foreseeable misuse of the product.ls7 
I have selected a subset of warnings issues that illustrate the 
Products Liability Restatement's substantial fidelity to the decision- 
al law interpreted by its predecessor, the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, and the conformity of these approaches with tort goals of 
corrective justice and efficiency. The three selected facets are the 
rules pertaining to a manufacturer's discharge of its warning duties 
(1) regarding open and obvious dangers; (2) upon sale of the 
product to  an informed intermediary; and (3) upon sale of raw 
material to a downstream manufacturer. At the conclusion of these 
comments, I mill address an area to  which the decisional law x4.l 
surely give continued focus: warnings regarding risks to children 
posed by products intended primarily for use by adults. 
Warnings as to product hazards and instructions for reasonably 
safe use are established mechanisms of risk reduction, as they 
theoretically obligate manufacturers to  achieve "optimal levels of 
safety. "Optimal levels of safety," it must be noted, does not 
ThiS requirement was described in Stonley Industries v. P/.Af. Burr 6: Co., 784 F. 
Supp. 1570 (Fla 1992): 
The manufacturer must provide users with . . . adequnte vrnrning of o. 
produds dangerous propensities. In short, a manufacturer must take 
reasonable precautions to avoid reasonably foreseeable injuries to the users 
of its products and thereby assumes a duty to convey to the users of thnt 
product a fair and adequate warning of the dangerous potcntinlities of the 
products so that the user, by the exercise of rensonnble m, v d l  have fhir 
and adequate notice of the possible consequences of the product's use or 
misuse. 
Id at  1574 (citations omitted). 
Brown v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 667 P.2d 750,758 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). In Brown, a 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to the adequacy of wnrnings regding,  inter din, 
use of a nongrounded extension cord with a power source. Noting thnt "[rr]nrnings nre 
instructions as to dangers that might occur if the instructions nre not foUomedP tho court 
held that the manufacturer of an electrical extension cord had no duty to rrnm of dnngers 
resulting if the cord were cut. I d  a t  756. 
A comment to the Products Liability Restatement explains: 
[Section 21 (b) and (c), which impose liability for products thnt rue defectively 
designed or sold without adequate warnings or instructions and nre thus not 
reasonably safe, achieve the same general objectives ns does linbiity 
predicated on negligence. The emphasis is on crenting incentives for 
manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and marketing 
products. 
PRODUCTS LIABElTY RESTATEhfENT, supm note 1,s 2 cmt. a. 
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mean total, or even maximum, safety.ls9 The "informed consent" 
rationale reflects the societal judgment that a product user or 
consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to whether the 
product's utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of 
harm.160 
For example, in T.H.S. Northstar Assocs. v. W.R. Grace & 
Co.,l6' a suit brought by a Minneapolis building center for clean- 
up and abatement, the plaints  alleged that Grace's Monokote 3 
product contaminated the premises with asbestos. The federal 
appeals court affirmed an award of damages, entered by a jury that 
had been instructed as to a limited manufacturer's continuing duty 
to warn in these words: 
[Ilf a manufacturer learns that a previously distributed 
product poses a danger to users, it must give additional 
warnings or instructions that will enable users to make 
informed decisions and use the product safely. . . . A 
manufacturer has no duty to warn, however, if the user 
is or should be fully aware of all of the dangers inherent 
in the product, but past experience or familiarity with 
a product does not necessarily alert a user to all of the 
dangers associated with the pr0du~t . l~~ 
As suggested in T.H.S. North~tar, '~~ the key to evaluating the 
Products Liability Restatement and parallel state statutory and 
decisional law regarding warnings and instructions is in identifjring 
the primary role of a seller's informational obligation as one of 
Comment a clarifies: "Society does not benefit from products that are excessively 
safe-for example, automobiles designed with maximum speeds of 20 miles per hour-any 
more than it benefits from products that are too risky. Society benefits most when the right, 
or optimal, amount of product safety is achieved." Id. 
la, See, e.g., Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,1089 (6th Cir. 1973) 
("[A] true choice situation arises, and a duty to warn attaches, whenever a reasonable mnn 
would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it."); 
Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483,1498 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding that consumer has 
right to know risks so that he can make informed decision). 
16' 66 F.3d 173 (8th Cir. 1995). 
Id. a t  176. 
'" Id. a t  176-77. 
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informed consent.164 From the standpoint of corrective justice, 
warnings adequate to permit a product user to make an informed 
decision as to  whether to  expose himself or others to the risk are 
central to preservation of a product user's autonomy interests.Ia 
From an efficiency perspective, informed decisionmaking by 
plaintiff permits the buyer-seller transaction to be fairly character- 
ized as an agreement that avoids the extracontractual inefficiencies 
of involuntary wealth transfers.166 
Some critics of the Products Liability Restatement's warning 
provisions argue that section 2(c) and its commentary abandon 
fairness to victims in favor of economic and business expedien- 
~ y . ~ ~ ~  A partial response is that section 2(c) as interpreted by the 
Reporters faithfblly reflects the law regarding sellers' informational 
obligations as that law has developed over the last several de- 
c ade~ .*~~  It is worth bearing in mind that it has never been the 
objective of tort law that every injury have a remedy at law or 
equity, but rather that only socially unacceptable injuries (as 
perceived by proponents of corrective justice, efficiency, or both) be 
remedied.16' 
2. Corrective Justice. As a general proposition, a seller mill not 
be liable for failing to provide warnings regarding product risks 
la See also, e.g., Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 462 N.W.2d 348, 365 
Mch. 1990) (involving litigation arising from injuries suffered by diving into above-ground 
swimming pool). 
165 Conversely, a risk creator's interest in self autonomy diminishes to the extent thnt he 
has " 'already injected himself into the plaintiffs realm! " Andrulonis v. United Stntcs, 724 
F. Supp. 1421,1494 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Shlomo l'werski, Note, AlfSrmatiue Duty Afler 
Tarasoff, 11 HOF~TRA L. REV. 1013,1025 (1983). modifid on other grounds, 924 F.2d 1210 
(2d Cir. 1990). 
See supm notes 93-106 and accompanying text (discussing application of effiaency 
theory to products liability law as intended, in part, to discourngo involuntruy transfers of 
wealth). 
lm See generally Mark h1cLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Ti'am You  EL^ Though I 
Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law Is Wrong, 61 TEMJ. L REV. 
1125,1172 (1994) (arguing that "current doctrine is excessively pro-defendnnt and should be 
reformed in a pro-plaintiff direction"). 
'@See supm notes 3-4 and accompanying text (desaibing objectives and pmcess ofkLI.  
in draRing Restutemnts). 
Cf: Vernon Palmer, A Geneml Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability: 
Common Law, Civil Law, and Compamtiue Law, 62 Rn. L. REV. 1303,1312 11.30 (1988) 
(discussing Roman principle of injwicr under v~hich adamage caused in the exorcise of n right 
. . . was free &om liabiity"). 
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that are generally known or obvious. The rationale for not 
requiring warnings in such instances is found in Products Liability 
Restatement section 2 comment j, which states: "When a risk is 
obvious or generally known, the prospective addressee of a warning 
will or should already know of its existence. Warning of an obvious 
or generally known risk in most instances will not provide an 
effective additional measure of safety. n170 
The Products Liability Restatement preservation of this "open and 
obviousn rule is supported by the position taken in a majority of 
jurisdictions that there exists no duty to warn of obviously 
hazardous conditions.17' The approach adopted in the decisions 
comprising this body of law is stated by one court in this language: 
"A manufacturer cannot manufacture a knife that will not cut or a 
hammer that will not mash a thumb or a stove that will not burn 
a finger. The law does not require him to warn of such common 
dangers. n172 
In following this rule, the Reporters made no significant sacrifice 
in the corrective justice goal of risk reduction. The neutrality of the 
"open and obviousn rule is demonstrated by the difficulty in arguing 
that a person who would knowingly encounter an obvious risk 
would become less likely to do so if such risk were accompanied by 
a warning. Moreover, there is a social cost to overwarning. As 
stated by Henderson and Twerski in a formative analysis: 
The most significant social cost generated by requiring 
distributors to warn against remote risks is the reduced 
effectiveness of potentially helpful warnings directed 
"O PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATE~ENT, supra note I,§ 2 cmt. j. Comment j reasons that 
"warnings that deal with obvious or generally known risks may be ignored by usors nnd 
consumers and may diminish the significance of warnings about non-obvious, not-genord- 
ly-known risks. Thus, requiring warnings of obvious or generally known risks could reduce 
the efficacy of warnings generally." 
"'See, e.g., Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding no liability 
on part of manufacturer of meat grinder in which plaintiffs hand became entnnglod); 
Fanning v. LeMay, 230 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1967) (finding no liability on part of mnnufacturor 
of shoes the soles of which became slippexy when wet). 
'" Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23,26 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In Jamieson, tho 
plaintiff had purchased an elastic exerciser that was essentially "an ordinary mbbor ropo, 
about the thickness of a large lead pencil, about forty inches long, with loops on the onds." 
Id. a t  25. Plaintiff was iqjured when the extended exerciser slipped and stmck hor in tho 
eye. Id. 
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towards risks which are not remote. Bombarded with 
nearly useless warnings about risks that rarely materi- 
alize in harm, many consumers could be expected to give 
up on warnings a1t0gether.l'~ 
Accordingly, the Products Liability Restatement rule gives 
appropriate recognition to the "human factorsn concern that a 
different approach--one commending warnings for obvious 
risks-would encourage an environment of overnarning that mould 
vitiate the effectiveness of warnings that are genuinely valuable 
and appropriate. 
As suggested earlier, under both the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts and the Products Liability Restatement, a strong informed 
consent rationale pervades warnings analysis; a representative 
expression of when the duty to  warn arises is " fvhenever a 
reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk in order to 
decide whether to expose himself to it. 3 n174 Thus, a core attribute 
of the Reporters' approach is one of vindicating the personal 
autonomy interest that underpins corrective justice. 
With respect to warning obligations to intermediaries, no 
hardship is worked upon corrective justice principles by continua- 
tion of the nearly universal rule that a warning only to an interme- 
diary mill satisfy a seller's obligations when, in the totality of the 
circumstances, it can be predicted that pertinent safety-related 
information mill be effectively conveyed to the end user. In a 
scenario often involving risks of personal injury to workplace users 
of the product, the Products Liability Restatement preserves the 
In James A. Henderson, Jr. &Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Cohpse in Products Liability: 
The Empty SheU of F d w e  to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 296 (1990). The authors 
continue: 
m h e  few persons who might continue to take ~vnmings seriously in an 
environment crowded with warnings of remote risks would probably 
overreact, investing too heavily in their versions of "snfety." Given these 
limits on the capacity of consumers to react effectively to excessive risk 
information, the optimal, rather than the highest, levels of risk infonnntion, 
measured both qualitatively and quantitatively, are what is d e d  for. 
Id at  296-97. 
Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811,814 (6th Cu. 1982) (quoting Borel 
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,1089 (5th Cu. 1973)); see also Borel, 493 
F.2d at 1090 ("A product must not be made available to the public without disclosum of the 
dangers that the application of reasonable foresight would reveal."). 
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conventional rule regarding a seller's informational obligation to 
remote users. In the Reporters' words: 
The standard is one of reasonableness in the circum- 
stances. Among the factors to be considered are the 
gravity of the risks posed by the product, the likelihood 
that the intermediary will convey the information to the 
ultimate user, and the feasibility and effectiveness of 
giving a warning directly to the user.17= 
This approach is in no material way unlike that suggested by the 
earlier Restatement (Second) of Torts, comment n,176 and it is 
consistent with the protocol described in the leading case law.17' 
A like conclusion can be reached in claims arising from use of, or 
contact with, raw materials. In terms of corrective justice, the 
sellers of raw materials, many of which are transformed into a 
seemingly limitless array of applications by downstream partici- 
pants in the commercial chain, have not, in any meaningful way, 
caused a plaintiffs harm. As a plaintiff may pursue a remedy 
against the distributive participant who did work the allegedly 
h a n d 3  change or modification in the material that triggered a 
warning obligation, the principles of corrective justice likewise are 
preserved. 
3. Eficiency-Deterrence. In the main, the Products Liability 
Restatement's treatment of warnings can be harmonized readily 
with both Posner's market efficiency and Calabresi's least cost 
avoider approa~hes.'~~ By declining to take a position that 
suggests that a warning should be given even where the risk and 
17' PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATE~~ENT, supra note 1,s 2 cmt. i. 
17' See RESTATE~~ENT (SECONI)) OF TORTS 5 388 cmt, n (1979) (setting forth in far moro 
particularized fashion approach recharadenzed in comment i of Products Liability 
Restatement). 
ln A leading case on this point is Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (3d 
Cir. 1976). Dougherty states: 
[Lliability arises when the seller, having reason to know that its product is 
likely to be dangerous for its intended use, and having no reason to believe 
that the intended user will realize its dangerous condition, nevertheless fails 
to exercise reasonable care to inform the user of the dangerous condition. 
Id. at  177. 
17' See supm notes 92-118 and accompanying text for a discussion of these views. 
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the means of its avoidance are abundantly clear, the Reporters 
avoid adding unnecessary precautionary costs to the marketing of 
products of utility. The Reporters to the Products Liability 
Restatement observe that: 
[flrom a fairness perspective, requiring individual users 
and consumers to bear appropriate responsibility for 
proper product use prevents careless users and consum- 
ers from being subsidized by more careful users and 
consumers, when the former are paid damages out of 
funds to which the latter are forced to contribute 
through higher product  price^."^ 
While phrased in terms of fairness, this assertion speaks with 
equal persuasiveness in terms of efficiency.lEO 
Regarding the Products Liability Restatement's approach to 
warnings to intermediaries and with respect to ram materials, the 
influence of efficiency considerations is even more apparent. In 
confirming that the objective of Products Liability Restatement 
section 2(c) comment i is indistinguishable from that of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 388 comment n,lE1 the Reporters empha- 
size the Products Liability Restatement's goal of lowering accident 
PRODUCTS L I A B m  RFSTATE~ENT, supm note 1,§ 2 cmt. a 
But see Howard A. Latin, Behavwml Criticisms of the Restatement Vhird) of Torts: 
Products Liability, 16 J. PROD. & TOMCS LIAB. 209 (1994). Latin nryes: 
m e  Reporters suggest] that courts should avoid requiring warning nbout 
"obvious product" risks. However, courts often disagree about \~hich 
particular product hazards are obvious, and the Reporters offer no guidance 
on just how obvious a risk must be before courts should hold as n mntter of 
law that warnings need not mention the risk. A h a d  obvious to 80 pertent 
of product users would not be evident to the other 20 percent, and the costs 
of providing a more complete warning to this minority group may be justified 
in comparison with the accident losses that could be prevented. Once it is 
acknowledged that human cognitive capacities and receptivity to new 
information vary widely, which is amply demonstrated by the sodal science 
evidence, there is no reason to assume that a riskSbviousm to many product 
users will be equally "obvious" to others. 
Id. a t  216. Latin sets forth considerable social science evidence supporting this assertion in 
Howard A. Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitatwm, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 1193 (1994). 
la' Comment i of section 2(c) of the Products Liubility Resfatement ond comment n of 
section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts both pertain to wnrnings duties to third 
persons. 
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costs by recognizing that it is ordinarily the workplace supervisor 
who can most efficiently and effectively communicate risk informa- 
tion, particularly in settings involving bulk sales of potentially 
hazardous materials.ls2 Thus, the Products Liability Restatement 
promotes an efficient rule that would relieve the component or 
ingredient supplier of liability when the component or ingredient 
is not itself defective. In such circumstances, the component or 
ingredient supplier ordinarily has no meaningful control over the 
hazard level, if any, of the finished product.1s3 As between the 
ingredient supplier and the downstream assembler or formulator, 
the propel: conclusion is that the downstream formulator, with its 
superior (and often exclusive) knowledge of the product's end use, 
and which is responsible for ultimate design, formulation, packag- 
ing, risk information and marketing, should remain the principal 
locus of potential liability.la4 
Illuminating in this regard is Shell Oil Co. v. Harri~on,'~' a 
suit brought against the manufacturer of the chemical DBCP, 
which was sold to a formulator who used it as an ingredient of a 
18'See PRODUCTS LIABILITYRESTATEMENT, supm note 1,§ 2(c) Reporters' Note, cmt. i, No. 
5 (explaining rationale behind rule and noting comment i's relationship to comment n of tho 
Restatement (Second) of Torts). See generally M. Stuart Madden, Liability of Suppliers of 
Natural Raw Materials and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability-A First 
Step Toward Sound Public Policy, 30 U. MCH. J.L. REFORM 281 (1997). 
'" Any substance can be hazardous. As the 16th century physician Paracelsus stated: 
"What is not a poison? All things are poison and none without poison. Only the doso 
determines that a thing is not a poison! " Charles E. Envay, 111, The Ingredient Supplier 
Defense, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 269,273 & n.15 (1994) (quotingAMEXtICAN CONFERENCE 
OF GOVERNNE~AL INDus. HYGIENISTS, THRESHOLD L~~TVALUES-DISCUSSION ANJJ THIRm- 
FIVE YEAR INDEX WiTH RECObhlENDATIONS 332 (1984)). 
la See, for example, George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507 (Wash. 19871, an indemnificn- 
tion action brought by a pharmaceutical company against the supplier of the nctivo 
ingredient diethylstilbestrol (DES). Finding no proper liability for the ingredient supplior, 
the court explained: 
DES is not inherently harmful, and still is prescribed today for ailments not 
associated with pregnant women. Thus, it is the way in which the ingredient 
DES is used, and not DES per se, which is harmful. . . . [The FDA] requires 
the tablet manufacturers . . . to account for and warn of a drug's proporties. 
. . . It would therefore be anomalous to require the raw [ingredient] 
manufacturer to conduct separate tests to determine the adverse effects of tho 
[end productl when by federal statute, the [end productl tablet manufncturer 
bears this responsibility. 
Id. a t  515, discussed in Erway, supra note 183, a t  274. 
lss 425 So. 2d 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
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fumigant claimed to  have injured farm workers. As the court 
stated: "Mabeling and packaging requirements necessarily differ 
depending on the particular [end product] formulation and, thus, 
place the responsibility on the formulator for providing adequate 
warning to the public . . . . n186 
simil&ly, and illustrative of application of the least cost avoider 
approach, is Beauchamp v. R~sse l l , '~~  involving the issue of the 
connection, if any, between an air valve component in a pneumatic- 
ally-run pelletizer and the injury of plaintiffs spouse. The court 
suggested that the duty to warn should properly be placed upon the 
participant in manufacture with the greatest access to information 
and the easiest means of its dissemination.'* In the words of the 
court: 
The responsibility for information collection and dissem- 
ination should rest on the party who has the greatest 
access to the information and who can make it available 
at the lowest cost. Where a component part is incorpo- 
rated into another product, without material change, the 
manufacturer of the part is in the best position to bear 
this re~ponsibi1ity.l~~ 
Id at  70; see also White v. Weiner, 562 k 2 d  378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 19891, afd, 583 A.2d 
789 (Pa. 1991), a suit brought against Eli LiUy 8: Co. for failure to provide \7amings on the 
chemical compound protarnine sulfate, supplied in bulk to Upjohn Compnny nnd employed 
as an ingredient in a prescription drug sold by the latter. The Penxisylvanin court held thnt 
LiUy had no tort duty to warn the end user, inasmuch as the end product producer wns in 
a superior position to assess risks and decide upon the form and content of ndequnte Inbeling 
and instructions. White, 562 k 2 d  at 386. 
Some components can be effectively labeled. For example, in F14 v. KDZ Syluan Paols, 
Inc., 981 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1992) the court held as a matter of law thnt the manufacturer of 
a replacement liner for an above-ground swimming pool is not relieved of tho duty to 
warn-though the liner is considered a component part-because the liner mnnufnchver 
knew the "liner would ultimately be incorporated into a pool, nnd nothing else? Id nt 118- 
19. Thus, the producer could "reasonably foresee the potentinl risk of fniling to aDiirs waning 
labels." Id 
lm 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1982). 
Id at  1197. 
Id; see also  RESTATE^ (SECOND) OF T o m  8 402A cmt. q (1979) vihich, whilo not 
specifically addressing warnings, states with respect to strict liabiity jpmdly:  qt is no 
doubt to be expected that where there is no change in the component part itself, but i t  is 
merely incorporated into something larger, the strict liabiity be found to carry through 
to the ultimate user or consumer." The suggestion that in apportioning linbity between n 
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Courts generally have responded to warnings issues involving 
raw materials by finding no warning duty absent a showing that 
the material itself-in its bulk form-was defective,''' or by 
resort to several developed exceptions to seller warning obligations. 
These exceptions have included, without limitation, defenses 
pertaining to bulk sellers, extrapolations from the component part 
supplier defense, the ingredient supplier defense, the sophisticated 
user or sophisticated buyer defense, and the so-called learned 
(better termed "informed") intermediary defense.''' Under one or 
component part manufacturer and an assembler, liability should be assigned to the cheapest 
cost avoider is explained in Richard D. Cunningham, Comment, Apportionment Between 
Partmakers and Assemblers in Strict Liability, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 544,547 (1982): 
Under this approach, the fact finder should simply ask who can more easily 
detect and correct the defect. . . . m h e  party with the lowest detection costs 
would bear full liability, but could shift this liability to the party with tho 
lowest correction costs if it provided a full warning of the detected dangers. 
Ordinary, merchantable granite, for example, or aluminum of a particular gaugo, 
would be representative examples of nondefective naturally occurring raw materials, as tho 
propensities and the capacities of the materials are universally known. 
lgl The Reporters state in comment o to Products Liability Restatement section 2: 
Raw materials are a subset of the broader category of component parts. 
Regarding the issue of defective design, i t  is diflticult to say how a basic raw 
material such as sand, gravel or kerosine could be defectively designed. If 
there is an inappropriate design in the use of such materials, tho failing 
ordinarily is not attributable to the seller of the raw material, but rather to 
the fabricator that put them to use. Regarding most raw materials, tho 
manufacturer of the integrated product has such a large comparntivo 
advantage in this respect that raw material sellers are generally not subject 
to liability for defective design of the end product. The same considerations 
apply to failure-to-warn claims against providers of ravr materials. 
Many courts have invoked special doctrines such as the "raw material 
supplier defense" or the "bulk salesfsophisticated purchaser rule" to negato 
liability. Notwithstanding these judicial invocations, special rules are 
unnecessary to absolve sellers in appropriate instances. If the materials are 
not themselves defective within the terms of $5 1 and 2, their sellers should 
not be liable. 
PRODUC~S LIABILITY RESTATE~~NT, supm note 1, § 2 cmt. o. In example 5 to section 2, 
comment o, the Reporters hypothesize: 
LMN Sand Co. sells sand in a large bulk volume. ABC Construction Co. 
purchased one ton of sand to use in mixing cement. LMN is aware that 
improper mixture of sand with other ingredients can cause the cement to 
crack. ABC utilized LMN sand to form a supporting column in a home that 
it built. As a result of the improper mixture the cement column gave way 
during a mild earthquake and caused iqjury to the occupants of tho homo. 
The injured occupants have no cause of action against LMN. The sand sold 
by LMN is not defective within the meaning of Sec. 2. 
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a combination of such approaches, there should be no warning 
obligation placed upon the seller of a raw material that, during 
transit to  an anticipated fabrication, allegedly causes injury a t  the 
intermediate stage. For example, in Spellmeyer v. 'Neyerhaeuser 
Corp.,lg2 a personal injury suit brought against the manufacturer 
alleging that it failed to prepare wood pulp bales properly for 
shipping, the court granted Weyerhaeuser summary judgment on 
the strict liability count, explaining: 
Imposition of strict liability is premised on the sound 
policy consideration that the manufacturer who markets 
his product for use and consumption by the general 
public is best able to bear the risk of loss resulting from 
a defective product. The thrust of Section 402A is, 
accordingly, to protect the "ultimate user or consumer" 
of the product. . . . In the instant case, Weyerhaeuser 
produced and packaged a raw material in an intermedi- 
ate state, which was stored awaiting shipment to 
another processor. It did not harm or endanger any 
"ultimate user or consumer;" only expert loaders and 
expert carriers were required to  deal with it. We 
therefore conclude that, because of the character of the 
"product" and the status of the plaintiff, the policy 
considerations which support imposition of strict liabili- 
ty in other contexts are too severely diluted here and 
dismissal was correct as to the strict liability theo- 
ly.lg3 
Congruent authority is found in Pennwalt Corp. v. Superior 
Coueg4 a case arising from injuries to  an eighteen-year-old 
plaintiff while he was attempting to compound chemicals at home 
to create fireworks. The raw materials at issue included sodium 
chlorate, aluminum powder, and sulphur, and plaintiffbrought suit 
against the manufacturer, distributor and retailer of each chemical. 
Id $ 2  crnt. o, example 5. 
544 P.2d 107 Wash. Ct. App. 1975). 
193 Id. at 109-10. 
* 218 Cal. Rptr. 675 (Ct. App. 1985) (not officially reported). 
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The California Court of Appeals held that the bulk chemicals 
manufacturer could not be liable to plaintiff for the sale of a 
chemical that had been repackaged, relabeled, and distributed 
through a retailer over which the manufacturer had no control,105 
4. Discrete Residual Issue of Children Injured by Products 
Intended for Adult Use. The Products Liability Restatement's 
retention of a blanket rule that a seller need not warn of obvious 
dangers has long seemed inadequate with respect to one small but 
important plaintiff constituency: the child injured using a product 
intended for adults. In products liability law generally, a manufac- 
turer may be relieved of responsibility for an injury associated with 
the use of or exposure to a defective product only where plaintiffs 
conduct is so unforeseeable as to constitute the sole legal cause of 
his injuries.lg6 A manufacturer's duty to warn of risks is not 
lg5 As the Court explained: 
[A] duty is only imposed on the manufacturer to warn the ultimate consumor 
in those cases that "involve tangible items that could be labeled, or sent into 
the chain of commerce with the manufactureis instructions . . . ." A bulk 
manufacturer "must be absolved at  such time as it provides adequato 
warnings to the distributor who subsequently packages, labels and markets 
the product. . . ." 
Sodium Chlorate has many legitimate uses, some of which involvo using it 
in conjunction with other chemicals. Pennwalt cannot be expected to 
anticipate every possible use and issue warnings of any potential danger 
involved in each such use. To hold otherwise would place an impossible 
burden on a bulk manufacturer which would be tantamount to imposing 
absolute liabiity for injury resulting from use of a product not claimed to bo 
otherwise defective. 
Id. at  677 (citations omitted); see also Walker v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 96 Cal. Rptr. 803, 
80406 (Ct. App. 1971) (arising &om plaintifPs injury caused by drain cleaner that exploded). 
Finding for defendant StaufTer Chemical, the bulk manufacturer of sulfuric acid (ono of tho 
ingredients of the cleaner), the court stated: 
We are referred to no California case, nor has independent research revealed 
any such, extending the strict liability of the manufacture (seller) to the 
supplier of a substance to be used in compounding or formulating the product 
which eventually causes injury to an ultimate consumer. On the contrary 
this dearth of authority indicates to us a reluctance on the part of the Bench 
and Bar to consider such an extension necessary or desirable for tho 
protection of the ultimate consumer. 
Id. at  805-06. 
lg6 See, for example, Kriz v. Schum, 549 N.E.2d 1155,1160-61 (N.Y. 19891, a suit brought 
by a swimmer rendered a paraplegic after sliding head first down a pool slide into an abovo- 
ground pool. Reviewing the Appellate Division's reversal of the trial court's grant of 
summary judgement, New York's highest court held that the swimmer's conduct in sliding 
into a pool of unknown depth was not an unforeseeable superseding cause. Id. 
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contined to risks involving intended uses of the product, but also 
foreseeable misuses.197 Foreseeability "does not require that the 
particular circumstances of a given accident be foreseen," but 
rather that an accident "of the type that [occurred was] objectively 
reasonable to  expect. n198 
Although the risks attending incautious use of many ordinary 
products is obvious to practically all adults, examples abound in 
which '(1) the product is sold routinely for use in settings where 
children may be expected; and (2) the risk is not so obvious to a 
child as it is to an adult. In such circumstances, courts routinely 
refuse to  apply the open and obvious rule in a strict sense, instead 
shaping the foreseeability requirement to  the specific situations of 
the cases before them. 
Illustrative is Strothkamp v. Chesebrowh-Pond's, Inc.,lm the 
appeal of a trial court's judgment n.0.v. following an award of 
actual and punitive damages to a child who, at age five, severely 
injured his ear using appellee's Q-Tips brand cotton swabs. 
Reversing in part, and remanding for a new trial on actual 
damages, the court explained: 
[Als the foreseeable risk of injury increases so does the 
duty of care. The manufacturer or seller of products 
may satisfy this increasing duty of care in several mays; 
including a warning or packaging in child resistant 
containers . 
Where the prudent manufacturer mould foresee that 
a condition or propensity of the product is likely not to 
be fully knom and appreciated by those using it, and 
that some use to which the article is likely to be put mill 
197 For example, in Tn'vino v. Jarnesway Corp., 539 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 19891, the 
court addressed an injury arising from the ignition of a child's Hnllomecn costume cr&cd 
from cosmetic cotton-rayon p& glued to a pajama costume exterior to simulnh n fur coat. 
Reversing summary judgment granted to the puffmanufacturer, the court explnined: 'While 
we agree that plaintiffs use of the cotton puffmas a misuse in the sense thnt i t  rim outside 
the scope of the apparent purpose for which the puffs \ . ~ e r ~  mnnufnctured, \ve cnnnot agee 
that plaintiffs misuse was unforeseeable as a matter of law." Id nt E4. 
Yassin v. Certified Grocers, 502 N.E.2d 315,324 (ill. App. Ct. 1986). In Yassin. n 
child's hand was injured in a grocery store meat tenderizer. Id a t  318-19. 
No. 60645,1993 R% 79239 (hfo. Ct. App. Mar. 23,1993). 
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be unreasonably dangerous without that knowledge, the 
duty of care requires a warning.200 
In Bean v. B E  C ~ r p . ; ~ ~  a wrongtl death suit arising from a 
fire caused by a disposable butane lighter, the Alabama Supreme 
Court entertained the claimant's argument that the product's spare 
warning-"keep out of the reach of childrenn-was inadequate. In 
the court's words: 
[Tlhe Beans argued that the warnings were inadequate 
because they (1) failed to warn about the attractiveness 
of the lighters to small children, (2) failed to warn that 
small children could easily operate the lighters, and (3) 
failed t o  warn of the serious danger of fires started by 
small children with lighters. The Beans argue that BIC 
failed to show the absence of a genuine issue of material 
fact to be determined by the jury. We agree. n202 
Telling as well is the decision in Shaw v. Petersen;03 a parental 
suit against a swimming pool owner emanating from injuries to a 
nineteen-month old child, in which the court stated: " 'The 
characteristics of children are proper matters for consideration in 
determining what is ordinary care with respect to them, and there 
may be a duty to take precautions with respect to those of tender 
years which would not be necessary in the case of adults. 9 n204 
Appropriate, then, to the evaluation of a manufacturer's warnings 
obligations concerning a product intended for adult use, but which 
will in the ordinary course come into contact with children, is 
consideration of "the ability of the child to appreciate the risk 
involved. "'05 A Restatement-based interpretation that omits 
consideration of the specter of injury to children whose age, 
experience and judgment preclude full appreciation of risk, and 
Id. at *4*5. 
597 SO. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992). 
'02 Id. at 1353. 
821 P.2d 220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
Id. at 222 (quoting Shannon v. Butler Homes, Inc., 428 P.2d 990,995 (Ariz. 1967)). 
Id. at 223. 
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therefore informed consent, fails the autonomy interest of warnings 
jurisprudence dating to BoreL206 
B. SEVERAL LIABILITY FOR NONECONOMIC HARhI 
1. Generally. In general terms, under joint and several liability, 
a tort victim injured by two or more tortfeasors "may recover his 
total damages from any one of the actors, regardless of the portion 
of fault attributable to  that t~rtfeasor.*~~ Joint liability benefits 
the plaintiff by enlarging the likelihood of full recovery for proved 
harm when one or more of the joint tortfeasors are either insolvent 
or cannot be joined in the action.208 
Aaron Tmerski has described the conventional joint and several 
liability approach as "accentuat [ingl and exacerbat [ing] all the 
imperfections in the present tort compensation system. nz09 A 
principal argument against retention of joint and several liability 
is that the doctrine provides an incentive for plaintiffs to collect 
Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); see supm note 
174 (discussing Bod). 
'07 Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation. A Systematic Evaluation of 
Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Seveml Liability, 73 CORNELL . REV. 628, 
635 (1988); see also hfICHAEL HOENIG, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: SUBSTANTIVE, PROCEDURAL AND 
PonmIssvEs 191 (1992) ("At common law, the joint and several linbiility imposed upon joint 
tortfeasors was indivisible. Thus, any one of the joint tortfeasors was liable to the injured 
party for the entire damage." (citing hiusco v. Conte, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589, 593 (App. Div. 
1954))). Hoenig further cites Musco as suggesting that 'Yhe common-la~v doctrine wns &ed 
at deterring the commission of a single rrrongfd act by the concert of several persons who 
were proceeding in unisonn Id. 
Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among hfultiple Responsible Causes: A 
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability forActual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1141,114243 (1988). 
'09 Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt? A Ratwnnl Response to the 
Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.REV. 1125, 1143 (19891, discussed in Richard C. Ausness, An 
Insurance-Based Compensation System for Product-Related Injuries, 58 U. P m .  L. REV. 669, 
703 & a173 (1997). 
The doctrine's distortion of realistic settlement negotiations is described by HOENIG, supm 
note 207, a t  193, in these words: 
The more significant policy of encouraging reasonnble settlements is 
undermined because realistic evaluations of true culpability need not impact 
upon the settlement demands. An artificially high range of settlement 
evaluations ensues. The tendency is to look at overall exposure, i.e., "how 
many millions will this jury possibly award to this plaintiff?," rnther than 
"how much of the potential award is really attributable to this defendnnt's 
fault?" 
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their award from the party with the deepest pocket, not the party 
whose causal contribution to the harm may have been the great- 
est?1° 
At the state level, joint and several liability has been modified or 
abolished by at least thirty-three states?'' Such reforms have 
ranged from total abolition, to abolition for defendants fifty percent 
or less liable, to  abolition with limited exceptions.212 
Even with this widespread modification of joint liability, the 
Senate authors of the Reform Act claim that under the law of most 
states, joint and several liability translates into "deep pocket" 
litigation, meaning "that a defendant who is found only one percent 
at fault can be burdened with an entire damages award. n213 ~h~ 
A.L.I. Reporters' Study: Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury 
also recommended reforming the doctrine of joint and several 
liability?" 
The keform Act proposes adoption of the so-called "California 
rule," under which defendants are liable only for their " 'fair share' 
of responsibility for noneconomic loss, such as pain and suffer- 
ing."215 The Reform Act would set no limits on noneconomic 
'I0 See Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case for 
Reform, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 651,652 (1988) (arguing that "plaintiffs often target porsons 
they perceive to have the greatest resources from which to pay claims"). 
'I1 See Shuchman, supra note 125, a t  491 & n.27 (referencing Insurance Information 
Institute figures as of 1994); see also VICTOR S C ~ A R T Z ,  CO~IPARATIVE N GLIGENCE app. B 
(3d ed. 1994) (listing statutes). 
2n BEACON HILL INST., SUFFOLK UW.,  THE ECONOblICS OF MASSACHUSMTS TORT L h l V  
17-18 tbl. 2 (Draft 1997). 
'* S. REP. NO. 105-32, a t  55 11.202 (1997) (citing Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 516 So. 
2d 198 @la. 1987)). 
'I4 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 123, a t  147. 
'16 S. REP. NO. 105-32, a t  55; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 9 1431.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) 
(enacting "California rulen); NEB. REV. STAT. 9 25-21,185.10 (1995) (same). 
This proposal differs from that of 2 R?dPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 123, at 128, which 
proposes the following approach: 
[Where] the risk [exists] that one of several defendants is insolvent or 
unavailable[, this burden1 should not be shouldered exclusively by solvent co- 
defendants or by the plaintiff. Rather, this risk should be shared by both the 
plaintiff and the defendants. Each solvent defendant would be liable for an 
insolvent or unavailable defendant's share of any judgment only in proportion 
to the solvent defendant's negligence or equitable contribution to the 
plaintiffs loss. 
'This 'allocative' approach," the study concludes, %odd more fairly apportion the risk of 
insolvency or unavailability than does either the traditional [joint and several liability] 
Heinonline - -  32  Ga. L. Rev. 1 0 7 2  1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8  
19981 CORRECTNE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY 1073 
harm, and the calculation of several liability would take into 
account the causal contribution of all entities, be they parties, 
nonparties, settling parties, or Joint and several 
liability mould be retained with respect to economic damages. 
Reform Act proponents have presented extensive evidence of the 
"extreme and unwanted c~nsequences"~'~ of joint and several 
liability. One particularly strong example of the negative impact 
of the doctrine is its effect upon suppliers of raw materials for a 
variety of products. At congressional hearings a sports equipment 
manufacturer executive testified that her company, one of only two 
domestic manufacturers of football helmets, did not manufacture a 
baseball safety product "because no raw material supplier would 
accept the potential liability of supplying components for the new 
safety product. n218 
2. Corrective Justice. Opponents of the Reform Act's limitations 
on joint and several liability are primarily concerned that the 
proposed rule mill fail to  adequately compensate injured parties. 
The most conspicuous congressional critic of statutory modification 
of joint and several liability has been Senator Ernest Hollings, who 
castigates Senate Bill 648 as a reversal of the historical achieve- 
ment of joint and several liability. The Senator lauds the doctrine 
in its full common-law application for its role in ensuring that "all 
persons involved in distributing and profiting from a dangerous or 
defective product, and who have engaged in irresponsible behavior 
that led to the plaintiffs injury caused by the product, [ d l  be held 
liable for the plaintiffs harm. -219 
approach, which places this risk on defendants alone, or certain recent legkhtive 
modifications which impose this risk entirely on the plaintiff? 2 id. at E8-29. 
216 S. 648,105th Cong. 9 110 (1997); accord DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc, 828 P A  140,145 
(CaL 1992) (holding that California rule limits joint linbility for noneconomic hnrm to 
defendanfs causal sharek Fabre v. hiarin, 623 So. 2d 1182,1184 @In. 1993) (" Tho obvious 
purpose of the statute was to partially abrogate the doctrine ofjoint rind several Linbiity by 
barring its application to non-economic damage. To exclude from tho computation the fault 
of an entity that happens not to be a party to the particular proceeding would thwart this 
intent.' " (quoting blessmer v. Teacheis Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 610,611-12 (Fla Disk Ct. App. 
1991))), overruled on othergrounds by W e b  v. Tallahassee hiem? Med. Ctr., 659 So. 243 249 
(Fla. 1995). 
S. REP. NO. 10532, at 55. 
218 I d  at 56 & nn.203-04. 
2* I d  at 70. 
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Those opposing placing limitations upon pure joint and several 
liability for noneconomic damages might endorse the comments of 
former California Chief Justice Bird, who once stated in dissent: 
For a child who has been paralyzed from the neck 
down, the only compensation for a lifetime without play 
comes f!rom noneconomic damages. Similarly, a person 
who has been hideously disfigured receives only noneco- 
nomic damages to ameliorate the resulting humiliation 
and embarrassment. 
Pain and suffering are afflictions shared by all human 
beings, regardless of economic status. For poor plain- 
tiffs, noneconomic damages can provide the principal 
source of compensation for reduced lifespan or loss of 
physical capacity. . . . mhese plaintiffs may be unable 
to' prove substantial loss of future earnings or other 
economic  damage^.^" 
Thus, according to Bird, and presupposing identical accidents to 
two economically disparate plaintiffs, the less wealthy plaintiff 
must rely more heavily upon noneconomic damages to achieve just 
recompense for the harm. In this situation, the poorer plaintiff 
bears the brunt of the several liability for noneconomic harm 
provision, because he will be the plaintiff who bears the greater 
risk of achieving a verdict that fails to fully compensate him in the 
event that one or more of the tortfeasors are unavailable or 
insolvent.221 
=Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665,689 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), 
discussed in Andrew F. Popper, A Federal Tort Law Is Still a Bad Idea: A Comment on 
Senate Bill 687,16 J .  PROD. & TOXCS LIAB. 105,12425 (1994). 
Chief Justice Bird's concerns are illustrated by a question posed by Mmlc Grady: 
"Suppose a doctor makes an error in two cases. In one the patient is a person earning 
$15,000 a year and in another it is a person earning $150,000 a year. Which pationt collects 
the larger benefit payment (damages award) from the doctor?" GRADY, supra note 26, a t  432. 
Grady's question highlights the arguably regressive impact of a several damages for 
noneconomic harm reform. Apart from medical and rehabilitative costs, economic harm for 
accident-related loss is tied substantially to income level. Even assuming identical iqjuries, 
medical and rehabilitative expenses, and time out of work, those plaintiffs enjoying olevated 
incomes will, should they prevail a t  trial, receive more for their economic loss than will thoir 
lower earning counterparts. Thus, preservation of joint and several liability for economic 
harm only, while facially neutral, operates to the greater advantage of tho wealthy. Id. 
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Similar concern for the plight of the poorer plaintiff is found in 
the Legal Realist argument "that one important reason for tort 
liability was to conscript the providers of economic goods and 
services to purchase insurance (third-party insurance) for the 
benefit of their customers.n222 As Grady explains, "Of course, the 
customers could purchase their o m  first-party insurance, but the 
Realists feared that many consumers, because of poverty or 
improvidence, would decide not to do so."= Accordingly, if, as a 
class, poorer persons are less likely than wealthier persons to have 
procured first-party insurance, the risk of incomplete redress for 
noneconomic harm falls more heavily upon the poor. The wealthy 
may have .first-party insurance which includes provisions for pain 
and suffering or quality of life compensation even prior to subrogat- 
ed litigation against multiple tortfeasors. This hypothesis is not 
affected by the supposition that a legal change to several liability 
would push first-party insurance rates upwards, as higher first- 
party insurance rates would only accentuate the impact of already 
existing economic realities distinguishing those with such insurance 
and those without. 
A further attack on the Reform Act rule is launched by Andrew 
F. Popper, who has mitten: 
The mere fact that pain and suffering are difficult to 
quantify should not mean that plaintiffs are somehow 
not entitled to joint and several liability. . . . By making 
joint and several liability unavailable for noneconomic 
damages, those plaintiffs with the most devastating 
injuries would end up undercompensated, even though 
they have proved the liability of the defendant.=' 
In addition, Popper argues, tertiary accident costs are elevated by 
any several liability reform proposal, in that "[sluch victims mould 
be forced to pursue [in separate litigation] each party who had been 
in any way responsible for the victim's injury. n2W 
Id  
2p Id  
Popper, supm note 220, at 125 (criticizing several liability provision of enrlier reform 
proposal). 
= Id. 
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The Reporters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportion- 
men.6!26 are advancing as one option for Institute evaluation a 
rule that would track the Reform Act in confining joint liability to 
economic harm while providing several liability under applicable 
comparative fault principles for noneconomic harm.227 The 
Apportionment Restatement Reporters suggest two reasons for 
preserving joint liability only for economic harm. The first 
rationale is that other compensation schemes, such as workers' 
compensation, do so.228 This option's reasoning fails to take into 
account that the workers' compensation scheme has always been 
visualized as a bargained-for exchange in which those suffering 
workplace injuries could recover economic loss without being 
subjected to  the uncertainty and expense of tort litigation. The tort 
system remained available for recovery of other losses for which 
parties other than the employer are responsible. The employer, 
who for a finite and relatively predictable assessment in workers' 
compensation insurance coverage would be relieved of defending 
tort claims for greater amounts, would also benefit from this 
exchange. 
Thus, within the workers' compensation system, both workers 
and employers relinquish something of value in order to achieve 
other benefits. To use the logic of workers' compensation as a 
justification for several liability for economic harm as a "reform" 
rings tinny, because unlike the respective sacrifices made by 
workers and employers when workers' compensation was created, 
the Reform Act and the potential Apportionment Restatement 
provision bring nothing to the bargaining table for plaintiffs. 
Rather than enjoying a filial bond with other economic-harm, strict- 
liability, social insurance schemes, the latter approaches are totally 
parasitic, as they reduce or eliminate potential claims and offer 
nothing in return. 
The second rationale advanced by the authors of the Apportion- 
ment Restatement several liability option is based in part upon the 
assumption that "providing a damaged plaintiff with . . . economic 
P6 RESTATEhfENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONhENT (Council Draft No. 2, 1997) 
[hereinafter APPORTION~ENT RESTATEMENT]. 
P7 Id. 8 25E & cmt. c. 
P8 Id. 5 25E cmt. c. 
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damages is more important than providing full recovery of nonecon- 
omic damages."229 That recovery of one dimension (economic loss) 
of plaintiffs damages may be more pressing than the other 
(noneconomic loss) scarcely justifies restricting plaintiffs' access to 
the latter and venerable avenue to  full redress of plaintiffs' total 
proven harm. Furthermore, the Reporters offer no empirical 
evidence to support the supposition that injured plaintiffs as a 
group mould more jealously guard a right of joint recovery of 
economic damages over noneconomic, or the reverse. 
Able criticism of such proposed "reform" is raised by corrective 
justice proponents such as Richard W. Wright, who uses the 
paradigm of a coffee poisoning in which an intentional poisoner and 
a negligent poisoner each lace decedent's coffee with a lethal 
dose.230 Upon a jury finding that the intentional poisoner is 90% 
responsible, and the negligent poisoner 10% responsible, and 
assuming the unavailability or insolvency of the 90% culpable actor, 
Wright questions the fairness of a several liability approach that 
would confine the estate's claim to 10% recovery.231 An important 
part of Wright's argument is its claim that the jointly liable party's 
successful or unsuccessful contribution or indemnity claim against 
another tortfeasor "is secondary to the plaintiffs prior and indepen- 
dent corrective justice claim against each t~rtfeasor.''~~~ In other 
words, even as between the injured plaintiff and the only slightly 
culpable defendant, principles of corrective justice dictate that 
compensating the plaintiff has priority over the slightly culpable 
defendant's quarrel with disproportionate liability. 
Id 
PO Richard W- Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Seueml Liability, 23 
ST. U. L. REV. 4559-62 (1992). 
Id. at  60. 
PZ Id. at 61, discussed in Lilly v. hfarcal Rope 6: Rigging, 682 N.E.2d 481,488 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1997); cf. DIAMOND ET At., supm note 42, a t  228: 
m e r e ]  all of the joint tortfeasors, by definition, acted tortiously and actudy 
and proximately caused the plaintiffs iqjury[,] [iln most cases, under usual 
'but for' causation analysis, the injury mould have been totally avoided if my 
of the defendants had acted nonculpably. In this sense, the percentage 
allocation determined by the fact-finder is only a comparative measure of on 
ideal apportionment among wrongdoers, each of whom, it can k argued, 
should be fully liable to the plaintiff for all the plaintiffs losses beauso m y  
one of them could have, by acting non-negligently, protected the plaintiff from 
any injury. 
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For its insight, Wright's argument seems limited by its premise 
that each poisoner "put enough poison in plaintiffs coffee to kill 
her.n233 This scenario does not directly speak to the joint and 
several liability examples that proponents of several liability love 
to hate, i.e., when a defendant's substandard conduct contributes 
only minimally to plaintiffs harm, but imposition of joint and 
several liability burdens that defendant with the majority, or even 
the totality of plaintiffs proved damages. Emblematic of the 
problem is the notorious plaintiil's verdict in Walt Disney World Co. 
v. Wood,234 which involved an amusement park bumper car 
accident in which plaintiffs judgment-proof fiance was adjudged 
85% responsible, plaintiff 14% responsible, and Walt Disney World 
1% re~ponsible .~~ Disney ultimately was held liable not only for 
its participation in the injury, but also for the lion's share of the 
insolvent tortfeasor's liability, leaving Disney responsible for 86% 
of the damages in a suit in which its causal contribution was but 
3. Eficiency-Deterrence. No substantial economic analysis seems 
to have been devoted to evaluating the efficiencies of specific 
"reformn measures abrogating common-law joint and several 
liability for noneconomic loss. A brief examination of the various 
economic views, however, reveals that the Reform Act provision 
would have mixed success in terms of its evaluation under econom- 
ics principles. 
The early California Supreme Court decision in Ybarra v. 
S ~ a n g a r d , ~ ~  understood ordinarily as a res ipsa loquitur case, 
demonstrates how economic principles can be argued to support 
233 Marcal Rope & Rigging, 682 N.E.2d at  487. 
515 So. 2d 198 @la. 1987). The plaintiff in the case sustained injuries when tho 
bumper car she was driving was rammed from behind by the car driven by her fiancb. Sho 
sued Disney, who then sought contribution &om her fianc6. Id. at  199. 
Id. 
Ps Id.; see also 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 123, a t  151 n.28 (discussing Disney). 
208 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1949). Ybarra was a suit against the nurses and doctors in 
attendance during plaintifi's surgery, as well as the hospital a t  which the surgery took plnco. 
Id. Plaintiff was anesthetized for an appendectomy, but while he was unconscious, ho 
suffered a partially paralyzing injury to a nerve in his shoulder. Id. at  445-46. Bocauso 
plaintiff was unconscious and could not prove the cause of his injury, the court shifted tho 
burden to the defendants to prove that they were not responsible. Id. a t  447. Any defendant 
who could not so prove should, the court concluded, be held liable. Id. 
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retention of conventional joint and several liability. Of the various 
defendants, nurse Thompson is surely the attending health 
professional whose commissions or omissions were least likely to 
have been a substantial factor in plaintiffs paralysis and atro- 
phySa8 Yet even conceding that of several tortfeasors it is most 
efficient to  hold only the one who can most readily detect and 
correct the risk liable for failure to do so, nurse Thompson surely 
is a cheaper cost avoider than at least some of the other parties 
(e-g., the plaintiff or the hospital staff at large). Should one or 
more of the surgeons have exacted binding exculpatory agreements 
from plaintiff prior to the operation, or should they by demonstra- 
tion of appropriate care be able to rebut the inference raised by 
application of res ipsa loquitur, the several liability approach 
advanced by the Reform Act would leave plaintiff able to recover 
only a fraction of his noneconomic damages. Certainly in this 
setting, principles of enterprise liability (a Rubicon reached and 
crossed years ago) commend retention of joint liability as to the 
remaining defendants, including nurse Thompson. 
A saving efficiency argument favoring some form of reform along 
several liability lines (although not necessarily that contained in 
the Reform Act) is found in Calabresi's least cost avoider approach. 
As noted, Posner agrees that as to risk remediation, me do not want 
all joint tortfeasors to participate, but rather only the tortfeasor 
who can take action most efficiently. In the ordinary course, and 
whether the defendant is an automobile manufacturer or an 
environmental polluter, the tortfeasor whose contribution to a 
plainWs harm is the greatest wil l  be the tortfeasor who can most 
readily and efficiently detect and remedy the risk. 
Following this line of reasoning, the greatest incentives for 
efficient (and societally acceptable) conduct should ordinarily rest 
with the party that can foresee or remedy that wasteful or harmful 
conduct, while proportionately lesser incentives would be apparent 
to tortfeasors whose likely causal contribution would be less. To 
conclude otherwise would, in Judge Higgenbotham's Testbank 
PS See RICHARD k POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOBUC ANALYSIS 319 (1982) 
(discussing defendants' burden and implying that Thompson should bo errculpntcd). 
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reasoning, make potential liability so great in relation to wrongdo- 
ing as to  disassociate conduct from consequences.239 Accordingly, 
several liability's preservation of a proportionality between risk- 
creation and potential liability is probably the optimal approach to 
satisfaction of deterrence goals. 
Nevertheless, simple efficiency principles seemingly support 
retention of joint liability in some form for noneconomic loss. 
Extrapolating from an example provided by Robin Paul Mall~y,~~ '  
imagine a suburban water district and a residential water whole- 
saler together selling filtered well water to  local residents. The 
water of six particular homes is uniquely affected by contaminants 
in such quantities that make the water responsible for mild 
intestinal illness in those who drink it. Suppose further that the 
personal injury value is $100 per home, for a total of $600. Two 
options exist for remedying the problem. First, a water filtering 
device can be installed at the district distribution point at a cost of 
$300. Alternatively, each resident can be provided with a home 
water purifier at a cost of $75 per home, at a total cost of $450. 
Installing the filter at the distribution point eliminates total 
damages of $600 at a cost of $300, and represents the efficient 
economic solution. 
Under the Reform Act approach to  several liability for nonecono- 
mic damages, a resident enduring pain and suffering loss due to  
intestinal illness caused by the contaminated water would be 
unable to recover some proportion of his proven harm should one 
of the two arguable tortfeasors (the water district and the residen- 
tial water wholesaler) be insolvent. In addition to the hardship 
imposed upon residents by this illness, such an approach invites 
several inefficiencies, not the least of which is that a several 
liability for noneconomic harm approach undermines the economic 
efficiency of the least cost avoider approach. Absent a rule of joint 
liability that would obligate acknowledgement that the capacity of 
either joint tortfeasor to recognize and remediate the risk was 
superior to that of plaintiffs, the potential tortfeasors and the 
P3 See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana ex rel. Gusto v. 
MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
WY, supra note 121, at 35-38. Malloy acknowledges the similarity of his examplo 
to that found in A. MrrCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOhUCS 11-14 
(1983). 
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potential victims alike are encouraged to undertake inefficient 
measures. The remaining tortfeasor that will be left answerable in 
damages knows at the very least that its liability mill be for less 
than the entirety of plaintiffs loss, and thus has less incentive to 
remedy the risk than it would under conventional joint liability. 
The potential victims, in turn, recognizing that should illness occur, 
they wil l  potentially be able only to gain reparation for a fraction 
of their noneconomic harm, may be prompted to take measures in 
their o m  hands, by, for example, adopting the inefficient course of 
installing filters in individual homes. 
In long latency disease litigation, the Reform Act change in joint 
and several liability wil l  actually create factfinding cost and 
complexity. Absent any authority for application of market share 
liability for asbestos claims or other claims not involving completely 
fungible characteristics, courts in asbestos cases particularly have 
frequently found expert testimony suggesting a zero tolerance for 
the substance, i.e., that exposure to  any amount of the product 
sufficed to  support a jury conclusion that each manufacturer in an 
ordinarily multiple defendant claim was jointly and severally liable 
for plainWs disease.241 As is generally known, many of the 
original producers of asbestos products are now bankrupt. The 
Reform Act approach would resuscitate the incentive of any 
particular defendant to dispute a zero tolerance thesis, and to 
attempt instead to produce proof that plaintiffs exposure to its 
product was so limited in time, proximity and density that its 
contribution to plaintiffs harm was small when compared to the 
causal contribution of the products of other manufacturers. Such 
medical-legal issues would necessarily be resolved in mini-trials of 
some nature, at substantial cost to the parties and to the judicial 
system.242 
"' For example, in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,1094 (5th Cir. 
1973), a plaintiffs suit against 11 asbestos manufacturers, the court stated thnt it was 
"impossible, as a practical matter, to determine with absolute certainty \vhich particular 
exposure to asbestos dust resulted in injury to Borel." 
242 Interestingly, it was the New Jersey Supreme Court's opposition to tho pohtinl 
bumper crop of mini-trials regarding the state of scientific knoivlcdge thnt Id it in Beshada 
v. Johns-ManviUe Products Corp., 447 k 2 d  539,545-49 (N.J. 19821, to rulo thnt in mbatos 
cases, state-of-the-art would not be a triable issue. 
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Calabresi suggests that, absent a coherent application of 
comparative fault to joint and several liability circumstances, the 
fairness or unfairness of retaining joint and several liability cannot 
be gauged. Assume, Calabresi proposes, a 60% responsible 
defendant, a 10% responsible defendant, and a 30% responsible 
plainLiff.243 Assume further that the 60% responsible defendant 
is unavailable or bankrupt. The jury places 70% of responsibility 
on the 10% responsible defendant, and 30% responsibility upon 
plaintiff. If the jury intended that plaintiff, even though three 
times more responsible than the remaining defendant, recover 70% 
of the total harm from him, the result, Calabresi writes, "seems 
both unfair and contrary to what the jury found. n244 If, on the 
other hand, the jury meant that the defendants together were 70% 
responsible, and that the 10%/60% allocation between them "was 
no more than an equitable split as to  them, a split that did not 
concern their individual responsibility to plaintiff at all," then, 
Calabresi suggests, retention of joint and several liability in a 
comparative responsibility context "might be as fair as the previous 
hypothetical made it seem unfair."245 Until, Calabresi concludes, 
courts appreciate "the full consequences of the shift from an all or 
nothing rule to a splitting rule[,] . . . efforts at reform are bound to  
be haphazard and nonsensical. n246 
C. LIMITED IMMUN'ITY FOR NONMANUFACTURING SELLERS 
1. Generally. It has been estimated that under the law of about 
twenty-nine states, nonmanufacturing sellers may be liable in 
products liability even though they contributed in no affirmative 
way to the claimed product risks.247 These sellers are, neverthe- 
less, drawn into the maw of products liability litigation.248 
263 Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 14, at 880-81. 
Id. 
z4s Id. at 881; see also DIAMONI) ET AL., supra note 42, at 228 (conceding that "from n 
compensation perspective, 'joint and several' liability better insures compensation to tho 
plaintifi"). 
Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 14, at 881. 
"' S. REP. NO. 105-32, at 33 (1997). 
U8 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: CASES AND bfAl%RItUS 764- 
55 (3d ed. 1996). 
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Should they be found liable for plaintiffs harm, they must seek 
indemnification or contribution from the party, ordinarily the 
manufacturer, whose active substandard conduct bears a closer 
causal connection to plaintiffs harm than does the seller's. This 
approach, the Reform Act authors argue, "generates substantial, 
unnecessary legal costs, which are passed on to  consumers in the 
form of higher prices. A more efficient approach would be for the 
claimant to sue the product seller only if the product seller is 
directly at fault."249 
~ G e r o u s  states have enacted statutes permitting nonrnanufac- 
turer liability only upon a showing of manufacturer insolvency or 
~navailability.~' Consistent with the approach taken in twenty- 
one states,251 Reform Act section 103 " 'recognize[s] the unfairness 
and illogic of imposing "strictn liability upon retailers and wholesal- 
ers who neither participate in the design process for products they 
sell, nor create warnings or instructions for a product. n Z 2  
Reform Act section 103: 
would hold product sellers, such as wholesalers and 
retailers, liable only if they are directly at fault for a 
harm (e.g., misassembled the product or failed t~ convey 
appropriate warnings to customers), unless the manu- 
facturer of the product is out of business or otherwise 
not available to respond in a lawsuit.w3 
S. REP. No. 105-32. at 33. 
250 E-g., C0I.D. REV. STAT. 13-21-402(1) (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. 8 29-28-106 (Supp. 
1995); WfiH REV. CODE ANN. 7.72.040(1) West 1992). 
The statutes of these states are collected in S. REP. NO. 10532 at 33 6: n.108: 
COLO. REV. STAT. 3 13-21-402; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 18 7001 (1989); 0.C.GA 
51-1-11.1 (Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 6-1407 (1990); 735 LLL COD. STAT. 
512-621 West 1992); IOWA CODE 613.18 (Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. 8 60- 
3306 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 411.340 @fichie 1992); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. 3 2800.53 West 1991); h a .  CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 5311 
(1982); h l r c ~ .  CoarP. LAWS 8 600.2947(6) (1996); h m .  STAT. Q 544.41 (1994); 
&lo. REV. STAT. 537.762 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. Q 25-21,181(1995); N J .  
STAT. ANN. § 2k58C-9 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2 (1995); N.D. CENT. 
CODE 8 28-01.3-04 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (Anderson 
1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 8 20-9-9 (hfichie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. 9 29-28- 
106; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 7.72.040. 
253 S. REP. NO. 105-32, at 33 & n.107 (quoting hkdden, supm note 61, at 570). 
I d  at 33-34. 
Heinonline - -  32  Ga. L. Rev. 1083 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8  
GEORGLA LAW REVIEW 
As the Senate authors explain, Reform Act section 103(b)(l): 
provides that a product seller shall be treated as the 
product manufacturer and shall be liable for the claim- 
ant's harm as if the product seller were the manufactur- 
er if (A) the manufacturer is not subject to service of 
process under the laws of any state in which the action 
might have been brought by the claimant, or (B) the 
court determines that the claimant would be unable to 
enforce a judgment against the manufacturer.254 
By way of illustration, the accompanying Senate Report states: 
a judgment would be unenforceable if the court finds 
that the manufacturer is bankrupt, insolvent, or other- 
wise unable to pay. A claimant may recover from the 
product seller for harms that were caused by the 
manufacturer if one of the two provisions applies, and 
if the claimant proves that the manufacturer would 
have been liable under state 
The Reform Act also precludes liability based upon assignment of 
an absence of due care (negligence) to a product seller where the 
seller's conduct consisted solely of an alleged failure to inspect a 
product where there was no reasonable opportunity to  inspect the 
product in a manner which would, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, have revealed the aspect of the product which allegedly 
caused the claimant's harm. n256 
2. Corrective Justice-Morality. Senate Bill 648 would affect, but 
in no meaningful way diminish, a plaintiffs access to money 
damages for tortiously-caused harm. The only two claims that 
2M Id. at 35. 
Id. As regards statute of limitations implications for the suit in which manufacturor's 
insolvency is not discovered until such time as the limitations period has run, section 
103(b)(2) provides that "the statute of limitations applicable to claims asserting liability of 
a product seller as a manufacturer shall be tolled from the date of the filing of a complaint 
against the manufacturer to the date that judgment is entered against the manufacturor." 
Id. 
2~ S. 648,105th Cong. 8 103(a)(2)(B) (1997). 
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characteristically might be pursued solely against the retailer, 
intentional torts and breach of express warranty,257 are pre- 
served.258 
The Reform Act provision jump starts the litigation process by 
providing that only the genuine parties in interest dl, as an initial 
matter, appear before the court. Where insolvency or lack of 
personal jurisdiction vitiates the ideal of requiring plaintiffs to 
proceed against the manufacturer, Senate Bill 648 circumstances 
plaintiffs as they mere before: they may proceed against the 
nonmanufacturing seller as though it were the manufacturer. 
Indeed, the practical effect of the federal Reform Act is more 
favorable to the plaintiff than the current laws of the many states 
that provide only for negligence-based causes of action against 
nonmanufacturing sellers.z59 In those states, an absent or insol- 
vent manufacturer can leave plaintiff totally without a remedy 
absent a showing of negligence on the part of the wholesaler or the 
retailer. 
3. Efficiency-Deterrence. In the words of Richard Ausness, "the 
imposition of liability upon nonmanufacturers provides only 
marginal benefits to accident victims while unnecessarily increas- 
ing litigation costs for everyone. n260 
A .  oft-cited rationale for holding nonmanufacturing sellers liable 
as though they were manufacturers is that wholesalers and 
retailers susceptible to such liability would influence manufacturers 
to make reasonably safe products.261 It has, however, never been 
See 1 MADDEN, supra note 105, $5 5.2.5 (describing cause of action for breach of 
express warranty)). 
25S S. 648 $ 103(a)(2). 
259 See 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 90,000 (June 1993June 1997) (collecting statutes, 
many of which reject strict liability standard for nonmanufacturing sellers). 
260 Ausness, supra note 209, a t  705. Ausness continues: 
For example, nonmanufacturers who are sued by accident victims m o t  rely 
on the product manufacturer to look out for their interests, but must 
participate in any litigation that occurs. In addition, v~holesnlers and 
retailers frequently have to bear the expense of a second In~vsuit in order to 
obtain indemnity from responsible manufacturers. In the interest ofreducing 
administrative costs, therefore, nonmanufacturers should not ordhri ly  ba 
held liable to injured consumers. 
Id (citations omitted). 
See, eg., Vandermark v. Ford hlotor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171-72 (Cd. 1964) fielding 
that both retailer and manufacturer may be strictly liable, with costs allocated among 
defendants). 
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successfully explained what marginal improvement in safety is 
gained when compared to the safety levels that follow from a 
manufacturer's already existing incentives to avoid liability costs 
associated with suits against it directly, as practically all modern 
products liability suits proceed. 
Likewise, the argument that no fairness is lost in such a system 
because an affected nomanufacturing seller can always seek 
indemnification from the upstream  manufacture^?^ fails to 
recognize important economic practicalities. The reality is that 
such sellers, who are ultimately liable for perhaps five percent of 
the damages paid out in products liability verdicts and settle- 
m e n t ~ : ~ ~  must routinely spend sizeable amounts of money to  
escape from their ordinarily nominal inclusion in suits that 
normally only involve liability issues between the injured plaintiff 
and the manufacturer. Thus seen, a substantial aspect of the 
efficiency argument favoring the nomanufacturing seller provision 
of the Reform Act is its reduction in the tertiary accident costs 
associated with having such sellers defend suits in which they will 
be required to respond in damages in only a small percentage of 
cases. 
IV. ASSESSMENT OF APPLICATION OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
AND EFFICIENCY PRINCIPLES TO SELECTED RESTATEMENT 
AND TORT REFORM PROVISIONS 
In this Section, I seek to  summarize the qualities and the defects, 
in terms of both the corrective justice-morality and the efficiency- 
deterrence models, of the selected Products Liability Restatement 
and Reform Act provisions discussed above. 
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. 8 16-116-107 (Michie 1987) (providing seller causo of action 
for indemnity from manufacturer); Hales v. Monroe, 544 F.2d 331-32 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(upholding indemnity from manufacturer to seller and distributor in claim alleging negligent 
failure to discover defect); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., 579 P.2d 48, 60 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (finding distributor appropriately indemnified by manufacturer whoro 
latter was timely notified but failed to appear in first action), discussed in S. REP. NO. 105-32 
at 34 n.109 (1997). 
263 See The Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 565 Before thc 
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on 
Commerce, Science, and  Tramp., 10th Cong. 361-62 (1995) (testimony of M. Stuart Madden) 
(noting studies demonstrating that  after taking into account actions for indemnification, 
sellers ultimately are liable for only five percent of damages). 
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The new Restatement's treatment of warnings fares well under 
both corrective justice and efficiency principles. The core consider- 
ation under both analyses is the model of informed consent, a tenet 
the Products Liability Restatement carries fonvard with fidelity to 
the decisional law. With the requirement that a seller provide 
adequate warnings or instructions where necessary to permit the 
user a true choice as to whether to use the product or to have 
others use it, the Restatement recognizes the personal freedom and 
autonomy requisites of the morality basis of corrective justice.2M 
The cognitive limitations-based "obvious risk" quarrels raised by 
Howard Latin265 arise only at the periphery of warnings factfind- 
ing, and must be assumed to be resolvable and within the ken of 
jurists and jurors, with the aid of expert evidence as appropriate. 
Mark Hage?66 misperceives the task of a Restatement as being to 
reform a body of law along one philosophical orientation or 
another.267 
From an efficiency perspective, the rule regarding adequate 
warnings should be applied to manufacturers, but not necessarily 
to other sellers. Absent substandard conduct on the seller's part in 
failing to warn concerning a risk known to it but not to the 
manufacturer, the manufacturer will typically be the creator of the 
risk, and therefore logically responsible for taking measures that 
will allow a user or consumer to make an informed choice, obviat- 
ing all or most extra-contractual inefficiencies. Likewise, a 
manufacturer will ordinarily be the least cost avoider, in that it, 
rather than the purchaser or the intermediate seller, is presumed 
to  be an expert in all knowable properties of the product? and 
2M Regarding warnings, the Products Liability Restatement and the state lnv? it reflects 
seem consistent with Sir Isaac Berlin's concept of npositive liberty," thnt is, thnt liberty 
"which harnesses and concentrates freedom to achieve a higher good." Pnul Johnson,A Low 
Risk Philosopher, N.Y. Thm, Nov. 12,1997, a t  A31 (providing retrospective of life m d  ~ i o r k  
of the late philosopher). 
Supm note 180. 
266 Supm note 167. 
267 The author confesses vulnerability to the same pull in suggesting thnt the mqjority 
rule regarding risks open and obvious to adults but not to children be refnshioned to take 
into account the scenarios described supm a t  notes 196-204 and nccompnnying text. I dnim 
a support for this proposition, however, a substantial body of decisional law. 
See Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(holding manufacturer of asbestos to knowledge and skill of expert). 
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will therefore ordinarily be in a better position than the user or 
consumer to know and, as appropriate, remedy the risks. 
Limited liability for nonmanufacturing sellers likewise proves 
favorable from both corrective justice and efficiency points of view. 
In terms of corrective justice, the Reform Act leaves a claimant 
with the full range of remedies available ex ante. A suit against a 
product manufacturer may proceed as before; should that suit be 
frustrated by reason of manufacturer unavailability or insolvency, 
recourse may be had against a nonmanufacturing seller as if it 
were the manufacturer. Potential statute of limitations snares are 
removed, as appropriate, as time expended in proceeding to 
judgment against the absent or insolvent manufacturer is forgiven. 
Express warranty and fault-based remedies against the seller are 
preserved. 
As regards efficiency, the arguments in favor of limiting nonman- 
ufacturing seller liability are also seemingly unassailable. At no 
cost to the plaintiff, the approach avoids the substantial tertiary 
accident costs of bringing into the litigation as an initial matter a 
seller who wil l  not ordinarily be ultimately responsible in damages, 
either through exculpation or through operation of indemnity or 
contribution. The Reform Act's nonmanufacturing seller rule 
seems, for these reasons, Pareto superior.269 
Senate Bill 648's several liability treatment of noneconomic 
damages is more troublesome. With respect to corrective justice, 
if one subscribes to the view that joint and several liability was 
employed initially to prevent the injustice of leaving a plaintiff with 
only a partial remedy, or no remedy at all, against tortfeasors 
acting in its forced retrenchment may not seem facially 
unjust, as only the rare modern products liability claim involves 
concerted activity liability. Wright's poisoned coffee paradigm, on 
the other hand, frames squarely the issue of the seeming injustice 
of relieving all or part of the burden of compensatory redress from 
the shoulders of the less culpable tortfeasor whose conduct 
nevertheless was a sufficient cause of plaintiffs harm.271 
zm See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text (explaining Pareto principles). 
no See supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing joint and several liability). 
n1 See supra notes 230-232 and accompanying text (discussing fairness of joint and 
several liability). 
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Moreover, Calabresi notes correctly that how several liability for 
noneconomic damages fares in terms of corrective justice turns 
upon reconciling a jury's ordinarily unscrutinized intent with a 
judgment's unambiguous effect.n2 From a Kantian perspective 
of equal rights--or what is sauce for the goose should be sauce for 
the gander-the proposed approach evidences Posner's "political 
observation with great emphasis on the "political" 
and scant recognition of the "morality." In addition, just as the 
contemporary multipoint analysis for evaluating "defect? has 
been seen as an elaboration upon Hand's algebraic evaluation of 
breach, so too comparative fault operates, in a significant may, 
simply as a more polycentric methodology for measuring and 
contrasting the parties' contribution to the harm, more supplely 
and more fairly than the crude operation of the contributory fault 
bar. Seen in this light, the advent of comparative fault gives no 
rise to any imperative for a course correction regarding joint and 
several liability. 
An efficiency perspective of limiting joint and several liability to 
economic damages may, as Calabresi suggests, shed little light, 
unless we proceed to a different level of generality and put the 
question as one of whether unfettered joint and several liability can 
be considered wasteful. The least cost avoider approach, with the 
premium placed on imposing liability upon the actor who can 
remedy a risk least expensivelp permits the conclusion that it 
is wasteful to require all tortfeasors, even those minimally a t  fault, 
to comport themselves as though they may bear responsibility for 
the totality of a harm. As Judge Higgenbotham suggested in 
T e ~ t b a n k ? ~ ~  once a tort rule's burden of potential liability bears 
no intelligible relation to actions through which a party can reduce 
risk, the deterrence attribute of the tort  rule  evaporate^.^' 
See supm notes 243-245 (noting that fairness ofjury's decision depends on what they 
intended and is therefore hard to discern from verdict alone). 
Supra text accompanying note 62. 
274 See Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125,128-29 (Or. 1974) (listing seven fnctors used to 
determine whether defect existed; factors aid "court in balancing the utility of the risk 
against the magnitude of the risk"). 
n5 See supm note 117 and accompanying text (discussing attributes of least cast nvoider 
approach). 
n6 Louisiana er re.?. Guste v. h W  Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Ci. 1985). 
Id at 1029; see supm notes 138-141 and accompanying text (dis&ig Testbanh). 
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Both corrective justice and efficiency tenets would be better 
served by a solution such as that adopted in many states providing 
for alleviation of joint and several liability when defendant's 
contribution to the harm is less than a defined amount.278 The 
least cost avoider approach and discouragement ofpost hoc coerced 
transfer objectives would remain intact under such a modified 
approach. At the same time, the plaintiff's paramount right to 
compensation for proved tortious harm would not be stemmed 
arbitrarily at the line separating economic versus noneconomic 
harm, but rather at a more logical threshold based upon the 
defendant's actual contribution to the harm, The deterrence 
objectives of both corrective justice and efficiency would, in fact, be 
best served by such a modified approach, as actors anticipating 
conduct (or omissions to act) routinely gauge planned action not 
upon considerations of potential liability for economic harm as 
opposed to noneconomic harm, but rather upon evaluation of the 
level at which their behavior is likely to be deemed a legal cause of 
plaintiff's overall harm.279 
In addition, a rule imposing several liability only for noneconomic 
harm would seem to have no "justice" rationale whatsoever in 
states where there remains the contributory negligence bar. This 
rule imperils the plaintiff's recovery for proved harm by stripping 
the claimant of a remedy upon evidence of plaintiffs incautious 
conduct, even where that conduct bears only a small relation to the 
overall causal sequence. Lastly, total abolition of joint liability for 
noneconomic harm is a more drastic remedy than is necessary to 
lessen the likelihood of a bizarre result such as that reached in 
Di~ney.~~' A confinement of joint liability to situations where a 
defendant's contribution to the harm exceeds, for example, fifty 
percent, would preclude the facially unjust imposition of a liability 
judgment bearing no relation whatever to a defendant's participa- 
tion in the wrongdoing. In the end, Disney should stand for no 
n8 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. 5 16-64122(b) (Michie 1987). 
The author must admit to taking a different position in testimony beforo tho Houso 
of Representatives and the Senate in the course of hearings on predecessor reform bills 
during the 104th and 105th Congresses. Based on my additional study of competing policy 
objectives, however, I concluded that it was necessary to change my position. 
Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198 (Ha. 1987). Recall that Disney is tho 
case in which Disney was held liable for 86% of plaintiffs damages, though it  was found only 
1% responsible for the harm. Supm notes 234236 and accompanying text. 
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proposition more broad than that odd cases make for bad legisla- 
tion. 
Corrective justice principles emphasize rectification, ~vhile 
economic efficiency emphasizes wealth maximization. The 
approaches are in accord that "[tlhe ultimate goal [of accident law] 
is to deter reckless or careless behavior[, as] [alny approach that 
deviates from this goal threatens to defend or to generate a useless 
set of rules. This Article demonstrates that while corrective 
justice may achieve deterrence only secondarily to its goal of victim 
compensation, and while efficiency principles may recognize victim 
compensation only as a corollary to an economic ideal, each is a 
necessary aspect of optimal tort policy. 
From either an economic or a corrective justice perspective, tort 
law "sets limits within which individuals may permissibly act. "282 
Corrective justice, appropriately applied so as to  hold liable in 
money damages parties whose acts or failures to act were a legal 
cause of a plaintif'Ps proved harm, satisfies societal objectives of 
fairness and morality without which the law's coercive authority 
would be repudiated. Moreover, despite frequent claims to the 
contrary, corrective justice principles have been recognized 
repeatedly by commentators and by courts as an engine of deter- 
rence, and encouragement of the actor's "fair chance to avoidn of 
which Holmes spoke.283 
Efficiency principles, whether they embody 'kealth maximiza- 
tion" principles or any alternative construct, undoubtedly signal the 
social opprobrium assigned to preventable accident ~ o s t s . ~  
Counsel advising clients in any business sector of significance 
already discuss economic principles of liability and the advisability 
of behavior consistent with such liability risks. Calabresi's accident 
cost rubric and cheapest cost avoider analysis is ordinarily 
281 Keith N. Hylton & Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Pamdux and Workers' 
Compensation, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109,124 (1992). 
Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and Pmctice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2579,2587 (1995). 
293 HOLn%, supra note 36, at 115. 
Supra note 112. 
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operative without the need for empirical factfinding, and can be 
applied readily by jurists not possessed of formal economics 
training.285 Identification of liability rules, pursuant to  these 
standards and generally understood, can operate to make third- 
party insurance acquisition more rational, and, where appropriate, 
the need for first-party insurance more apparent and less wasteful. 
The potential disjunction between rational business behavior and 
ethics has long been recognized:86 and it is therefore not surpris- 
ing that the objectives and effects of American Law Institute 
initiatives have been questioned:87 as have the objectives and 
'"See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text (discussing Testbank). 
For example, cost-benefit analysis has been castigated as amoral in products claims 
for chattel ranging from the Ford Pinto to the Dalkon Shield. See generally RONALD J. 
BACIGAL, TIIE L m m  OF LITIGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY (1990). Bacigal 
records that in the Dalkon Shield litigation, Judge Lord provided counsel for tho mnnufactur- 
er with a copy of a speech he made containing the observation that "the only reason offorod 
for corporate behavior was a bottom-line oriented cost-benefit analysis." "For examplo," 
Judge Lord continued, "ifthe cost to society from Dalkon Shield injuries totaled $50 million, 
and the cost of making the Shield safer was $100 million, then improving the Dalkon Shiold 
was not cost effective." Id. a t  29 (citing Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290, 
1309 (D. Colo. 1984)). 
Cf: Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rule Making 
Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909 (1995). Schwarcz's evaluation of tho 
Uniform Commercial Code revision processes could, with the substitution of "Americm Law 
Institute Restatement projectsn for "the Code," be applied for equal insight into tho Products 
Liability Restatement and other Institute pursuits: 
Dozens, sometimes hundreds, of lawyers and academics periodically meot, 
usually for days at  a time, to debate the myriad of rulemaking proposals that 
are advanced. This effort goes on for years. It takes anywhere from threo to 
five years for a statutory change to have been studied, drafted, and first 
proposed for legislative enactment. This requires an enormous devotion of 
human and professional capital. . . . 
Another flaw in the rulemaking process is that it creates an unintended 
momentum for change. Although at  no point vrithin the process is chango 
technically a foregone conclusion, the investment of time represented by the 
creation of a study committee, its solicitation of comments and suggestions, 
and its preparation of a report, create an incentive to revise the UCC, even 
where, objectively, change may be unnecessary. 
Id. a t  917-19 (citations omitted). Schwarcz adds, importantly, the arguments of Robort E. 
Scott, The Policies ofArticZe 9,80 Vk L. REV. 1783,1816-21 (19941, that UCC rulemaking 
processes are "susceptible to pressure from cohesive interest groups." Id. a t  919 & n.26. 
Calabresi and Cooper predict, I think incorrectly, that the Products Liability Restatement 
will fail to gain widespread adherence in the judiciary: "[Tlhe Restatement's influonco 
depends upon whether courts pay attention to it, which in turn depends on whothor tho 
Restatement actually reflects what is happening in the courts. And it is doubtful that this 
particular Restatement has much support in the courts." Calabresi & Cooper, supra noto 14, 
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potential effects of federal tort reform legi~lat ion.~ Yet, conced- 
ing such imperfections, it follows that in neither the corrective 
justice-morality analysis nor the efficiency-deterrence analysis do 
we reasonably expect perfect justice or perfect efficiency. Rather, 
the objective is to  identify optimal achievable objectives in both.= 
The so-called dichotomy between the corrective justice-efficiency 
analyses is by no means clear.290 In substantial measure, effi- 
ciency principles promote autonomy, and corrective justice princi- 
ples promote deterrence. The autonomy interests conventionally 
associated with the corrective justice-morality synthesis are 
furthered by the liability and deterrence components of the Hand 
formulation, as stated originally or as reconceptualized as a modern 
economic principle, and will ordinarily be vindicated in a finding of 
liability against an actor found to be the cheapest cost a~oider. '~~ 
Likewise, an efficiency-based interpretation of a finding of negli- 
gence can be harmonized with societal disapproval of wasteful 
conduct.292 Gary Schwartz has noted that tort's goal of deter- 
rence, "seen as a way of achieving the somewhat austere goal of 
economic efficiency, . . . also has deep roots in a humane and 
compassionate view of the law's functions.n293 Calabresi, in turn, 
concedes that "compensation remains a fundamental aim of 
at  866-67 (citations omitted). 
283 See genemUy Shuchman, supm note 125 (discussing various criticisms of present 
system of tort reform). 
283 Cfi PRODUCIS LIABILITY REWATE~ENT, supm note 1,s 2 cmt. n (The emphnsis is on 
creating incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and 
marketing products."). 
See Schwartz, supm note 28, at  1820. 
291John B. Attanasio, The Principle ofAggregaleAutommy and the Calobresion Approach 
to Products Liability, 74 Vk L. REV. 677,707-08 (1988). Attannsio explnins: 
In a real way, [the Calabresian] theory appeals to autonomy. In Cdnbrcsi's 
world, the lam is simply attempting to strike a propitious balance between 
liberty and order to preserve autonomy for as many individuals in society as 
possible. Both the best decider and internalization theories nfford primnry 
importance to the physical integrity of the individual. . . . Cdabrcsinn theory 
overtly appeals to autonomy. 
292 See supm note 112 (discussing Posneis efficiency theory of liability lntqr). 
293 Schmartz, supm note 28, at  1802; cf G.W.F. HEGEL, -ON IN HISTORY 92 (Robert 
S. Hartman trans., 1953) Cmhe highest point of a people's development is tho rational 
consciousness of its life and conditions, the scientific understanding of its laws, its system 
of justice, its morality."). 
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accident Ideally, this Article has contributed to rebutting 
the argument of some that economic or utilitarian concerns have so 
submerged modern tort, and perforce, products liability analysis so 
as to render discussion of corrective justice or morality almost 
quaint .295 
It may be stated broadly that for such accident litigation that is 
not preempted by statute, resolved by a regulatory compliance 
defense, or mediated by private or public insurance, there is a 
seeming societal and judicial acceptance that the highest and best 
objectives of tort law are a reduction in accident costs and the 
achievement of justice between and among the parties. As stated 
in the introduction to this Article, concepts of legal pragmatism 
provide a meanin@ opportunity to reconcile corrective justice and 
efficiency principles. In early observations on the centrality of a 
pragmatic assessment of law, Holmes stated: "The object of our 
study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the 
public force through the instrumentality of the courts. ~ ~ 2 9 6  
za CAWIBRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 22, a t  44. 
295 E.g., George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LI~~ILITE 
P E R ~ P E C ~ ~ V E ~  AND POLICY 184 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford winston eds., 1988). Priest 
asserts: 
Virtually all courts and commentators have embraced the goals of accident 
reduction and insurance that correspond to the principal economic effects of 
the law. There are only two important economic effects of any legal rule: a 
rule can provide incentives to reduce the accident rate and, for accidents that 
cannot be prevented, a legal rule can provide a form of victim compensation 
insurance tied to product sales. Although there are occasional references to 
fairness and equity, courts in products cases have largely focused on theso 
two economic goals alone in their elaboration of the law. 
Id. a t  185 (citations omitted). 
2ss Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 467, 467 (18971, 
reprinted in PRAG~~ATIsM: A READER 145,145 (Louis Menand ed., 1997) (emphasis added). 
In Holmes's words: 
The reason why [law] is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue 
for them or to advise them, is that in societies like ours the command of tho 
public force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, and the whole power 
of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and 
decrees. People want to know under what circumstances and how far they 
will run the risk of corning against what is so much stronger than them- 
selves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be 
feared. 
Id. Posner comments approvingly upon Holmes's development of pragmatic analysis. 
Richard k Posner, A Pragmntist Manifesto, in THE PROBLEhlS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454,463- 
64 (19901, reprinted in PRAG~~ATIs~~: A READER, supra, a t  418, 429-30. As Posner states, 
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In the context of describing the tenets of "pragmatism," William 
James defined "truth" in these terms: "mdeas (which are them- 
selves but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as 
they help us to get into a satisfactory relation with other parts of 
our e~perience."~~' To be regarded as "true," an idea or a philoso- 
phy need only be true "in so far forth," i.e., for so far as the idea 
goes.298 It follows that both corrective justice and efficiency 
principles must be regarded as "true" in that they hold significant, 
albeit nonexclusive, predictive value in anticipating the develop- 
ment of tort jurisprudence. Legal pragmatism permits us to 
recognize the importance of corrective justice principles even while 
conceding that the approach has marginal limitations in its 
deterrent effect. Similarly, efficiency principles are true and 
valuable from the standpoint of legal pragmatism as they provide 
an underlying rationale for numerous modern accident cases, even 
though issues of individual justice or community consensus as to 
the morality of conduct may not be at the leading edge of the 
economist's interests. 
Individual tort rules, be they the three discussed in this Article 
or others, must satisfy broader civil justice goals than simple 
efficiency or corrective justice. Such a broader tort goal may be 
the conjunction of lam and economics principles with those of 
corrective justice and morality. In the end, a tort rule that annuls 
a defendant's unjust enrichment and compensates a wrongfully 
injured plaintiff but only at an extravagant societal cost, will be 
rejected as irrational, as will a tort rule, however efficient and 
broadly utilitarian, that fails to dispense justice to the injured 
party?99 Thus seen, efficiency and corrective justice principles 
"HoImes's prophecy of 1897 is in process of being fulfilled at long last" I d  at 466 n.5. 
m ~ I L L M l  J ~ I E S ,  PRAGMATISM (1907), reprinted in PRACLIATlSht A A E R ,  supra note 
296, at 93,100 (emphasis omitted). 
z?a Id idea upon which we can ride, so to spenk; any idea thnt vrill carry us 
prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other pnrt, linking things 
satisfactorily. . . is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally Id. 
zssEpsteii's idea-experiment that for simple plaintiffdefendant tort dnims in vrhich h t h  
parties are partially at fault, a 50-50 proportionate responsibility could be applied nmss the 
board, and without regard to individual adjudication of comparative fault, might f d  into the 
category of a broadly utilitarian but too frequently individually unjust rule. See E m .  
supra note 50, at 98-99 (discussing utility of equal apportionment). 
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operate and will continue to  operate in a beneficial symbi0sis,3~~ 
each a check and a balance upon the other, with each as a neces- 
sary, but neither a ~ufKcient,3~~ rationale for modern accident law 
objectives. 
Werner Z. Hirsch also argues that these two theories frequently dovetail: 
[Seemingly] fundamental differences in premises and approach [between 
orthodox tort analysis and efficiency principles] turn out to be reconcilablo 
and can often be brought into harmony. For example, it can be argued that 
the 'rational' man in seeking his self-interest takes into consideration the 
effect of his decision on others to the extent that their reaction makes an 
impression. In this manner, we can explain how a person can be rational and 
at  the same time altruistic. In the more technical language of the economist, 
we would say that the effect of one person's decision on others can enter as 
an argument into the first person's utility function. 
HIRSCH, supra note 101, at  xviii. 
Cfi Bobby Jindal;Relativism, Neutrality, and Transcendentalism: Beyond Autonomy, 
57 LA L. REV. 1253,1270 (1997). 
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Senate Report 105-32 sets out this description of the twelve-year 
effort to pass broad-spectrum tort and products liability reform 
legislation: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
"S. 648 was introduced on April 24, 1997 by Senators Gorton, 
Ashcroft, McCain, Lott and Abraham. Although S. 648 is similar 
to S. 5, which bears the same title, there are important differences. 
S. 5 was introduced on January 21, 1997, by Senators Ashcroft, 
McCain and Lott. The text of. . . S. 5 is identical to that of the 
Conference Report of the product liability bill from the 104th 
Congress. That Conference Report mas vetoed by President 
Clinton. 
"On March 4,1997 Senator McCain chaired a Committee hearing 
on product liability reform. On March 6, 1997, Senator Ashcroft 
chaired a hearing of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, 
Foreign Commerce and Tourism to explore the success of the 
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994. That bill provided a 
statute of repose for general aviation aircraft. 
"The. Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 
favorably reported S. 648 by a roll call vote of 11 to 9. 
"The Committee has a long history of involvement with product 
liability reform. In the Committee's early treatment of the subject, 
it reported three bills, each of which was introduced by Senator 
Kasten. S. 2631 was reported by the Committee in the 97th 
Congress (S. Rep. 97-670), and S. 44 mas reported by the Commit- 
tee in the 98th Congress (S. Rep. 98-476). Congress adjourned 
without Senate action on either of these measures. 
"At the beginning of the 99th Congress, on January 3, 1985, 
Senator Kasten introduced S. 100, the Product Liability Act. This 
bill preempted state lam to impose uniform federal rules and 
standards of liability governing the recovery of damages for injuries 
caused by defective products. The legislation mas substantially the 
same as S. 44, which had been reported by the Committee during 
the 98th Congress. 
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"A Consumer Subcommittee hearing on S. 100 was held on March 
21, 1985 (Serial No. 99-84) and the bill was reviewed by the 
Committee at an executive session on May 16, 1985. At that 
session, the motion to report the bill was defeated by an 8-8 vote. 
"Prior to the May 16,1985 executive session, two amendments in 
the nature of a substitute to S. 100 had been introduced. One of 
these amendments (S. Amdt. No. 16) was introduced by Senator 
Dodd on March 19, 1985, and the other (S. Amdt. No. 100) was 
introduced by Senator Gorton on May 14, 1985. These amend- 
ments were complete substitutes for S. 100 that preempted certain 
aspects of state law and also established alternative expedited 
claim systems for limited recovery of damages in product liability 
cases. Hearings on the Dodd and Gorton amendments were held 
by the Consumer Subcommittee on June 18 and June 25, 1985 
(Serial No. 99-177). 
"After these hearings, the Committee staff was instructed by the 
Chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Danforth, to  draft 
a proposal that combined elements of all these measures. After 
review of extensive comments received from the public in connec- 
tion with the Committee's first draft, a second draft was released 
on November 20, 1985. This draft was formally introduced by 
Senator Danforth on December 20,1985, as S. 1999. This bill was 
the subject of two days of hearings before the Consumer Subcom- 
mittee on February 27 and March 11,1986. 
"On April 30,1986, Senator Kasten introduced an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute for S. 100 (S. Amdt. No. 1814). This 
amendment embodied recommendations for product liability reform 
that had been made by the administration's Tort Policy Working 
Group. 
"On May 12,1986, Senator Danforth introduced an amendment 
in the nature of a substitute for S. 1999 (S. Amdt. No. 1951). This 
amendment replaced the expedited claim system of S. 1999 with an 
expedited settlement system and made a number of other changes 
in S. 1999. On May 20, 1986, Senator Gorton introduced an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute to the Danforth amend- 
ment (S. Amdt. No. 1968). On May 19 and 20,1986, the Consumer 
Subcommittee held hearings on the Kasten amendment, the 
Danforth amendment, and the other product liability measures 
before the Committee. 
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"On June 3,1986, the Committee began its markup of product 
liability legislation. The markup draft bill was an original bill that 
embodied the provisions of the Danforth amendment to S. 1999. 
On June 12, the Committee adopted an amendment in the nature 
of a substitute for the original markup draft bill. On June 12,19, 
24,25 and 26,1986, the Committee continued its consideration of 
the amendment and added a number of other amendments before 
reporting S. 2760 as an original bill. S. 2760 came before the full 
Senate on September 17, 1986. On September 25, the Senate 
agreed to the motion to proceed to S. 2760 by a vote of 84 to 13. 
The bill was returned to the Senate Calendar, and no further action 
was taken. 
'The primary activity on federal product liability legislation in 
the 100th Congress occurred in the House of Representatives. On 
February 18,1987, Congressmen Bill Richardson and Thomas A. 
Luken introduced H.R. 1115, which was referred to the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee. The Subcommittee on Com- 
merce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness held extensive 
hearings on the need for federal product liability reform and on 
specific issues in the bill on May 5, May 20, June 18, July 21, 
August 6, October 7, and December 17, 1987. The Subcommittee 
met to mark up the bill on November 18,19, and 20, and December 
3 and 8, 1987. H.R. 1115 was reported by the Subcommittee, as 
amended, on December 8, 1987, by a vote of 11 to 3. On May 10, 
12,18, 19, and 24, June 1,2, 8, 9, and 14,1988, the Energy and 
Commerce Committee met to mark up H.R. 1115, voting on June 
14 to report H.R. 1115, as amended, favorably by a recorded vote 
of 30 to  12. H.R. 1115 then received a sequential referral to the 
House Committees on the Judiciary and on Education and Labor. 
The Education and Labor Committee held a hearing on September 
27,1988, on provisions in H.R. 1115 that affected workplace safety. 
The House Judiciary Committee took no action on the bill in the 
100th Congress. The sequential referral ran through the end of the 
session, so the 100th Congress adjourned without considering H.R. 
1115 on the floor of the House. 
"During the lOlst Congress, the Committee held three hearings 
on S. 1400, the Product Liability Reform Act, introduced by Senator 
Kasten (S. Hrg. 101-243). On May 22, 1990, the Commerce 
Committee reported an amendment in the nature of a substitute to 
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S. 1400 by a roll call vote of 13 to 7 (S. Rep. 101-356). The full 
Senate took no action before the adjournment of the lOlst Con- 
gress. 
"In the 102nd Congress, Senator Kasten introduced S. 640 on 
March 13, 1991. There were 36 cosponsors of the bill, including 
seven members of the Committee. On September 12, 1991, the 
Consumer Subcommittee held a hearing on S. 640 and the full 
Commerce Committee held a second day of hearings on S. 640 and 
S. 645, The General Aviation Accident Standards Act of 1991, on 
September 19, 1991. On October 3rd, the Committee favorably 
reported 8. 640 by a roll call vote of 13 to 7. 
"On May 7,1992, the provisions of S. 640 were incorporated into 
an amendment offered by Senator Kasten to S. 250, the National 
Voter Registration Act. On May 14, the amendment was tabled by 
a vote of 53 to 45. On June 26, the bill was sequentially referred to 
the Committee on the Judiciary until August 12. The Judiciary 
Committee held a hearing on August 5th but took no further action. 
Under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement, on September 
8, the Senate began consideration of a motion to proceed to consider 
S. 640. On September 10, the Senate failed to invoke cloture on 
the motion to proceed by a vote of 57 to 39. A motion to reconsider 
that vote was agreed to by a vote of 57 to 39, and a subsequent 
cloture vote failed 58 to 38. No further action was taken. 
"In the 103rd Congress, Senators Rockefeller and Gorton 
introduced S. 687, The Product Liability Fairness Act, on March 31, 
1993. The Consumer Subcommittee held a hearing on S. 687 on 
September 23, 1993 (S. Hrg.103-490). On November 9, 1993 the 
Committee ordered S. 687 favorably reported by a roll call vote of 
16 to 4. The bill was taken to the floor and on June 28, 1994 a 
motion to invoke cloture failed 54 to 44. On June 29,1994 a second 
motion to invoke cloture failed 57 to 41. 
"In the 104th Congress, Senators Jay Rockefeller and Slade 
Gorton introduced, on March 15,1995, S. 565, the Product Liability 
Fairness Act. On March 10, 1995, the House of Representatives 
had passed legislation, H.R. 956, the Common Sense Product 
Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995, by a vote of 265 to 161. On 
April 3 and 4, 1995, the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, 
Foreign Commerce and Tourism held hearings on S. 565 (S. Hrg. 
104-435). At the Committee executive session on April 6,1995, the 
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Chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Pressler, offered 
an amendment in the nature of a substitute that maintained the 
original content of S. 565 but, among other things, incorporated as 
Title 11, S. 303, The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act. S. 303 mas 
introduced by Senators Lieberman and McCain on January 31, 
1995, and was referred to the Commerce Committee. On April 6, 
1995, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor- 
tation favorably reported S. 565 as amended by the Chairman's 
mark by a roll call vote of 13 to 6 (S. Report 10469). The bill mas 
taken up by the Senate on April 24,1995 and was approved by a 
vote of 61 to 37 on May 10,1995. 
"A Conference Report, H.R. 956 the Common Sense Product 
Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1996 mas issued on March 14, 
1996. The Conference Report was very similar to the bill originally 
passed by the Senate. The Senate approved the Conference Report 
by a vote of 59 to 40 on March 21,1996. The House of Representa- 
tives passed the Conference Report on March 29 by a vote of 259 to 
158. The President vetoed the bill on May 2,1996." 
S. REP. NO. 105-32, at 15-19 (1997) (citations omitted). 
Heinonline - -  32 Ga. L. Rev. 1101 1997-1998 
